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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

COMPETITION, STATUS AND MARKETS

Extant research within competitive dynamics recognizes a positive
relationship between high levels of competitive activity and firm performance, but the
cognitive and psychological antecedents to competitive activity are far less clearly
understood. I explore the role of a specific psychological antecedent - status, in impacting
firms’ motivations to launch competitive moves against rivals. The key question, which
extant literature does not seem fully equipped to answer, is when and under exactly what
circumstances lower-status firms become motivated to launch action against higher-status
ones and vice-versa. I use the stimulus-response model in social cognition to build theory
which helps to answer the question by considering structural properties of market
engagement. The specific structural property of market engagement that I focus on is
market commonality, or the extent to which a rival is a significant player in markets
important to a focal firm. I predict that a rival’s market commonality with a focal firm
and its status relative to the focal firm have independent and positive effects on the extent
to which the focal firm pays attention to the rival, that a rival’s market commonality with
a focal firm and its status relative to the focal firm interact negatively to predict the focal
firm’s motivation to launch action against that rival, and that a rival’s relative status and
market commonality with a focal firm interact positively to predict the extent to which
the focal firm pays attention to the rival. I test theory through a field study on gourmet
food trucks in Lexington and an experiment through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk tool.
Results provide broad support for the hypotheses. Three consequences follow from my
study – that high-status firms are likely to come under attack from lower-status firms with
whom they do not compete in markets, that they are unlikely to be paying attention to
those lower-status firms when first attacked, and that they are likely to become aware of
and motivated to act against those lower-status firms only after the lower-status firms
have occupied key markets. My study contributes to the literatures in competitive
dynamics, status, multi-market contact, and entrepreneurial action.
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INTRODUCTION
The field of competitive dynamics is concerned with inter-firm rivalry based on
competitive actions and responses, the contexts of those actions and responses, and their
antecedents and consequences (Chen and Miller, 2012; Smith, Ferrier and Ndofor, 2001).
The emphasis on actual competitive actions and responses between firms and rivals
stands in stark contrast to other approaches to competition within strategy that have either
viewed competition as an aggregate property of industry structure (Porter, 1980) or have
considered strategic groups based on objective (Caves and Porter, 1977) or perceptual
considerations (Porac and Thomas, 1990; Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton and Kanfer,
1995) but have paid little attention to the possibility that there can be substantial variance
in competition across firm-rival pairs within a given industry or strategic group or that
characteristics of the actual exchange of competitive moves can bear upon the
performance of firms and their rivals.
The theoretical roots of the area of competitive dynamics can be traced back to
Austrian Economics (Jacobson, 1992; Mises, 1949). Unlike neo-classical economics that
has predominantly taken a static view, the Austrian view emphasizes the market process
and the role of purposeful action and market discovery by entrepreneurs (Jacobson, 1992;
Kirzner, 1973). From an Austrian lens, the emphasis is not so much on equilibria, as in
neo-classical economics, but on disequilibrium that is driven by the purposeful action of
entrepreneurs (Jacobson, 1992). The Austrians see competitive advantage as emanating
from the discovery of profit opportunities, that ensues from the learning engendered by
purposeful action by entrepreneurs (Kirzner, 1973).
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Consistent with views in its Austrian heritage, one of the most consistent findings
within the field of competitive dynamics is the strong positive link between carrying out
large numbers of competitive actions and firm performance (Chen and Miller, 2012;
Smith et al 2001), with competitive action defined broadly as “an externally directed,
specific, and observable competitive move initiated by a firm to enhance its relative
competitive position” (Smith et al, 2001). For example, Grimm, Lee and Smith note
(2006, p. 84 - 85) that Microsoft’s fifteen-year rise to power was marked by a dramatic
number of product introductions, announcements, marketing and professional moves, and
vertical alliances, several times as many as their closest rivals. Such competitive moves
may either be intended to improve one’s competitive position in general or targeted
towards specific rivals. Ferrier, Smith and Grimm noted (1999, p. 374) that firms that
carry out more competitive actions “close off potential for action” by rivals and Young,
Smith and Grimm noted (1996) that firms with high competitive activity build better
organizational knowledge assets through the learning that ensues from such activity.
Given the clear importance of competitive action, scholars have been keenly
interested in its antecedents. The overarching goal has been to understand what drives
firms toward launching competitive moves, which could include moves targeted towards
specific other firms or intended to gain market share in general. Past research has
unearthed several antecedents including structural properties of market engagement
(Baum and Korn, 1999; Chen, 1996), organizational characteristics like slack (Ferrier,
2001) and TMT heterogeneity (Hambrick, Cho and Chen, 1996), and embeddedness in
networks of co-operative relationships (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001).
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Recent research on antecedents to competitive action has highlighted the
importance of a cognitive and psychological element in firms’ motivations to launch
action. Scholars have, for example, advanced notions such as rivalry as a psychological
phenomenon (Kilduff, Elfenbein and Staw, 2010), competitive tension (Chen, Su and
Tsai, 2007), identity domains (Livengood and Reger, 2010), and the structure of top
management’s cognitive representation of the environment (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008), as
impacting the propensity to launch competitive action. While some progress has been
made along this direction, scholars generally agree that our understanding of the
cognitive and psychological drivers of competitive action is still very limited. For
example, Livengood and Reger note (2010, p. 49) that “competitive dynamics research
has largely overlooked the cognitive processes and motivations of managers” and that (p.
52) “Competitive dynamics theory is well-developed in understanding economic
incentives. We know less about the role non-economic factors play in understanding
competitive dynamics.” Although the larger fields of strategic management and
organization theory have long recognized the importance of considering psychology
when attempting to understand decision-making within organizations (Cyert and March,
1963; Hambrick and Mason, 1984), competitive dynamics research has only more
recently begun paying attention to the role of cognition and psychology as antecedents to
firms’ competitive behavior.
In my dissertation, I focus on the role of status as a cognitive and psychological
antecedent to competitive action. It is well recognized that most groups of individuals,
teams and firms are characterized by the presence of status hierarchies. Through these
hierarchies, some actors are accorded higher esteem and social worth than others (Chen et
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al, 2012; Piazza and Castellucci, 2014). Specifically, in the context of firms, a casual
glance within different industries and business settings reveals that firms within them
vary in the extent to which they are prestigious and admired and respected.
While past performance or quality of goods and services may play a role in
determining status, status is a distinct concept (Chen et al, 2012; Piazza and Castellucci,
2014) that is often only loosely coupled with past firm performance or actual (as opposed
to perceived) quality of goods and services because it is influenced by such factors as the
networks a firm is embedded in (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1993; Podolny,
2001) and history (Washington and Zajac, 2005). Possessing high-status, however,
endows firms with distinct advantages over rivals. For example, scholars have noted that
the signaling role of status lowers transaction costs when exchange partners are
confronted with uncertainty (Podolny, 1993, 2001), that an association with a high-status
producer may be something that market participants value (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999;
Washington and Zajac, 2005), and that the greater awareness of high-status firms lowers
advertising costs (Podolny, 1993).
A key question in this context is what role a firm’s position within a status
hierarchy plays in determining its motivation to launch competitive action against rivals
at the same or other positions within the hierarchy. In my dissertation, I use the term
“rival” to refer broadly to any other firm within the business context of a focal firm.
“Rival” in my dissertation thus refers to any potential rival within a business context and
not necessarily to a psychologically salient one as articulated, for example, in Kilduff et
al (2010). The question is an important one to answer because motivation to launch
action as just defined is the cognitive precursor to actual competitive action. Not only are
4

status hierarchies ubiquitous, but extant theory and empirical evidence suggest that status
hierarchies should impact the motivation to act against specific rivals.
Extant research, however, makes equivocal predictions on how status hierarchies
impact actors’ motivations to compete with one another. Theories such as system
justification (Jost and Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji and Nosek, 1994) point to a tendency for
even those who stand to be disadvantaged by a social hierarchy recognizing and
respecting the need for it and not questioning the positions of the actors who are
advantaged, given a prevailing legitimized belief that hierarchies in general are good and
fair for society (Jost et al, 2004; Magee and Galinsky, 2008). Indeed, some research
(Hahl and Zuckerman, 2014) points out that if low-status actors did not acknowledge the
positions of higher-status actors there would only be ingroup-outgroup distinctions rather
than status hierarchies. Moreover, given the signaling role of status, low-status firms face
clear disincentives when trying to compete with higher-status-ones, for example in
transaction and advertising costs (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Merton, 1968; Podolny,
1993). Finally, it is believed that high-status firms would lose their exclusivity and status
if they competed with lower-status ones (Podolny, 1993; Washington and Zajac, 2005).
These arguments collectively point to a tendency for status hierarchies to be relatively
uncontested, self-fulfilling and sticky (Magee and Galinsky, 2008).
On the other hand, a major stream of research points out that higher-status actors
are more closely watched (Anderson et al, 2001; Graffin et al 2013) and envied (Fiske,
2011) and past research has explicitly acknowledged the presence of conflict within
status hierarchies (Bendersky and Hays, 2012; Flynn, 2003; He and Huang, 2011;
Huberman et al Gould, 2003). Although lower-status firms face disincentives when
5

attempting to compete with higher-status rivals, there are clear benefits to doing so as
well, as just competing with higher-status rivals can result in a status boost for a focal
firm irrespective of the outcome of competition (Washington and Zajac, 2005), and if the
focal firm did win the battle there would be not just economic benefits but a motivational
boost as well (Kilduff et al, 2010).
Indeed, a close examination of many scenarios from the real world reveal clearly
that status hierarchies do not go uncontested. Japanese automobiles were considered lowstatus in the US in the 1960s and 1970s but that did not deter Japanese automakers from
going after the then higher-status Detroit automakers like GM and Ford and winning
market share against them. In the Silicon Valley, high-status firms like Google and Apple
face threats every day from start-ups that are relatively unheard of and that threaten to
erode their status positions and market share. In addition, there are several instances of
the opposite phenomenon as well where high-status firms launch competitive moves
against lower-status ones. With the introduction of its A-class hatchback series several
years ago, Mercedes attempted to make inroads into territory that was traditionally
reserved for relatively lower-status car makers.
Although academic research has noted status contests and there are several
examples of such contests in the real world, the question of when and under what
circumstances lower-status firms become motivated to break through the inertia and
launch competitive moves against higher-status ones and vice-versa is a largely
unresolved one. While some scholars (e.g. Gould, 2003; He and Huang, 2011) have tried
to answer the question by predicting that ambiguity within status hierarchies breeds
conflict, anecdotal examples from the business world clearly point to even very clear
6

status hierarchies being contested sometimes. It is an important question to the area of
competitive dynamics given that the outcome, intent to launch competitive action, has
major consequences for firm performance relative to rivals (Ferrier et al, 1999;
Hambrick, Cho and Chen, 1996; Young et al, 1996).
In my dissertation, I help to answer this question by considering the role of a
rival’s market commonality with a focal firm, which refers to the extent to which the rival
is a significant player in markets important to the focal firm. I use the stimulus-response
model in social cognition (Dutton and Duncan, 1987; Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Keisler
and Sproull, 1982) to build theory which makes several key predictions. First, I predict
that a rival’s market commonality with a focal firm, and the status of that rival relative to
the focal firm, have independent and positive effects on the extent to which the focal firm
pays attention to the rival. Second, I predict that the relative status of a rival and the
rival’s market commonality with the focal firm interact negatively to predict the focal
firm’s motivation to launch action against that rival. Finally, I predict that the relative
status of a rival and market commonality interact positively to predict the extent to which
the focal firm pays attention to that rival. I test theory in two empirical settings – a field
study on gourmet food trucks in Lexington, KY and an experiment through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk tool. The theory receives broad support in both contexts. Three
consequences follow from my theory – that high-status firms are likely to come under
attack from lower-status firms with whom they do not directly compete in markets, that
they are unlikely to even be aware of those firms at the time they are first attacked, and
that they are likely to become aware of and motivated to attack those lower-status firms
only after the latter have occupied key markets.
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In addition to competitive dynamics, my dissertation also contributes to the literatures in
status, multi-market contact and entrepreneurial action. Although scholars within the area
of status have acknowledged status contests (Bendersky and Hays, 2012; He and Huang,
2011), the question of when and under what circumstances low-status actors become
motivated to compete with higher-status ones and vice-versa has gone largely
unanswered.
A key theoretical underpinning within multi-market contact has been the idea of
forbearance (Baum and Korn, 1996; Edwards, 1955) which refers to firms exercising
restraint on attacking rivals that they meet in multiple markets. There is keen interest in
contingencies that moderate the forbearance hypothesis (Yu and Cannella, 2013) and my
dissertation highlights the role of status differences as such a contingency.
Finally, the area of entrepreneurial action (Gregoire, Barr and Shepherd, 2010;
McMullen and Shepherd, 2006) recognizes that opportunity recognition represents the
start of the process leading to entrepreneurial action. Scholars in this stream have
acknowledged that our understanding of the processes by which strategic decisionmakers recognize opportunities is very limited, given the considerable objective and
subjective interpretations involved in opportunity recognition (Gregoire et al, 2010). My
dissertation contributes to this stream, too, by suggesting that whether launching
competitive action against a rival at the same or a different position in the status
hierarchy is considered an opportunity by decision-makers or not may be contingent on
structural properties of market engagement.

8

LITERATURE REVIEW
Competitive Dynamics
Competition is one of the most fundamental notions in strategy. Indeed, the
academic discipline of strategic management is concerned primarily with competitive
advantage, or how firms create and sustain advantage over competitors (Nag, Hambrick
and Chen, 2007). The various streams within strategic management have attempted to
answer this question through different lenses. Early work in strategy (Porter, 1980), for
example, drew from the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm in Industrial
Organization Economics (Bain, 1956; Mason, 1939). The S-C-P paradigm held that an
industry’s structural characteristics, for example, product differentiation and economies
of scale, erected barriers to entry for potential newcomers and helped industries earn
returns above what would be expected in a perfectly competitive scenario (Bain, 1956).
While structure was presumed to influence performance through conduct, several
scholars noted that the paradigm was inadequate. The field of strategy is concerned with
the firm level of analysis, and is interested in how decisions by top managers may impact
performance, but the S-C-P paradigm treats conduct as a black box and firms as
homogenous (McWilliams and Smart, 1993), given its roots in Industrial Organization
Economics.
Given these inadequacies, later work highlighted firm-level heterogeneity in such
areas as resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) and CEO and top
management team characteristics (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), as key predictors of
competitive advantage. While they moved away from treating firms within an industry as
9

homogenous, most of these views still took a static approach to competitive advantage.
What was lacking was recognition of the possibility that the market process, i.e., the
actual exchange of moves and countermoves (e.g. Chen, Smith and Grimm, 1992; Smith
et al 1991) itself can have significant impact on firms’ performance relative to rivals.
A key premise in Competitive Dynamics, the area within which this dissertation is
situated, is that characteristics of how a firm competes in markets can endow it with
competitive advantage (Chen and Miller, 2012; Smith et al 2001). Key research questions
within competitive dynamics include the antecedents and consequences of delayed
responses from rivals (Chen et al, 1992), the antecedents and consequences of high levels
of competitive activity (Ferrier et al, 1999; Young et al, 1996), the antecedents and
consequences of carrying out a wide variety of competitive actions (Connelly et al, 2017;
Miller and Chen, 1996), and the impact of specific properties of competitive action
sequences on firm performance (Ferrier, 2001).
For example, key and consistent findings are positive associations between the
length of time taken by rivals to respond to a focal firm’s competitive moves and the
focal firm’s performance, and between high levels of competitive activity and firm
performance (Chen and Miller, 2012; Smith et al 2001). I proceed to review the
theoretical roots of this stream of research, studies at different levels of action
aggregation, studies of antecedents to competitive action and response, cognitive and
psychological antecedents, and the stimulus-response model within social cognition that I
use when developing theory in my dissertation and whose variant, the AwarenessMotivation-Capability framework, has been used extensively while building theory in
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competitive dynamics in general. I end by noting a specific puzzle that my dissertation
eventually helps solve.
Theoretical Roots
Competitive Dynamics is rooted in the tradition of Austrian Economics (Hayek,
1945; Kirzner, 1973; Mises, 1949). While mainstream economics is mostly interested in
equilibria, Austrian economics is interested in disequilibrium and more specifically in the
role of the market process. For example, the Austrians hold that, at a given point in time,
individual market participants are taking decisions based on incomplete knowledge, and
that entrepreneurs who learn from purposeful action discover arbitrage opportunities
(Kirzner, 1973). The notion of purposeful action is thus considered critical both to the
market process and to gains for individual market participants. Indeed, Jacobson noted
(1992, p. 785) that
“The Austrian School highlights profits not as the result of monopoly power but rather as
the consequence and the incentive for discovery and innovation. Under this view, the
goal of strategy formulation centers not on limiting competitive forces but rather on
entrepreneurial discovery.”
In this context, Joseph Schumpeter’s views (1934, 1942), have been a major
influence on strategy and competitive dynamics research. Schumpeter differed from
traditional Austrian Economics by acknowledging the existence of equilibria. However,
his emphasis on “creative destruction” is in agreement with Austrian views. In
Schumpeter’s view, the entrepreneur’s innovation disrupts the market and moves it away
from equilibrium. While the entrepreneur earns profits from doing so, the success of the
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innovation spawns imitation that erodes economic profits. Once again, purposeful action
by the entrepreneur is at the heart of the continuous creation and destruction of
competitive advantage.
One other area that merits mention is Hypercompetition (D’Aveni, 1995). This
area emphasizes that the pace of change in business today is greater than ever before and
that it is important for firms to disrupt rather than sustain their existing advantages in
defensive ways. Like competitive dynamics, Hypercompetition too is based on Austrian
thoughts and views. As with Austrian economists and competitive dynamics scholars, an
overarching theme within Hypercompetition is to de-emphasize actions like building
entry barriers and Bainian market power and to emphasize entrepreneurial discovery
(D’Aveni, 2010).
In the next section, I proceed to review research in competitive dynamics. There
has been work at three different levels of action aggregation – action-response dyads,
repertoires, which are collections of actions, and sequences, which are collections of
actions that take order and timing into account.
Action-Response Dyads
This is the oldest stream of research within competitive dynamics and is often
considered the most basic and concrete level at which competitive interaction occurs
(Chen and Miller, 2012). Starting from the mid-1980s, scholars were especially
concerned with how firms could launch competitive action while delaying responses
from rivals (Chen et al, 1992; MacMillan, McCaffery and Van Wuk, 1985; Smith et al,
1991). The motivation for these studies was past work (Nelson and Winter, 1982) that
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had concluded that delayed responses from rivals would provide a focal firm with a
longer temporal window to benefit from launching a competitive move.
Studies along this direction largely converged to support a positive link between a
focal firm’s performance and the length of time taken by rivals to respond (Smith et al,
2001). In addition, these studies unearthed characteristics that predicted the likelihood
and speed of response including, for example, action characteristics such as whether the
initial action was a strategic or tactical one, degree of organizational commitment to the
initial action, importance to the rival of the markets under attack (Chen et al, 1992) and
visibility of the initial action (Young et al, 1996). For example, Chen et al found (1992)
that strategic as opposed to tactical actions elicited fewer and slower responses and that,
when attacked in their key markets, competitors reacted slowly.
The Repertoire
Based on a view of strategy as a “pattern in the stream of decisions” (Mintzberg,
1978), this stream studies sets of competitive actions launched by firms over time
(Connelly et al, 2017; Ferrier et al, 1999; Miller and Chen, 1994) and by doing so attends
to issues of context (Chen and Miller, 2012). Scholars have been especially interested in
such characteristics of repertoires as the overall level of competitive activity (Ferrier et
al, 1999; Miller and Chen 1994), the extent to which the repertoire consists of a small
versus large number of action types, that is, simplicity (Connelly et al, 2017; Ferrier et al,
1999; Miller and Chen, 1996), and the degree to which actions within repertoires depart
from industry norms (Miller and Chen, 1996).
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This stream has produced several consistent findings. First, larger levels of
competitive activity have generally been linked to better firm performance (e.g. Ferrier et
al, 1999; Hambrick et al, 1996; Young et al, 1996). Competitive action simplicity seems
to generally have a negative impact on performance (Ferrier et al, 1999; Miller and Chen,
1996), although very recent work (Connelly et al, 2017) finds that complexity (the
opposite of simplicity) hurts short-term performance and has an inverted U-shaped
relationship with long-term performance, that is, complexity in that study seemed to
benefit firms up to a certain point beyond which it began hurting them.
Given the clear link between repertoire characteristics and firm performance,
several studies, including those above, have also explored antecedents. The range of
antecedents considered has been very broad and includes top management team
characteristics (Hambrick et al, 1996), firm size (Chen and Hambrick, 1995), ownership
structure and executive compensation (Connelly et al, 2017), past performance and
market growth (Miller and Chen, 1994), and breadth of competitive experience and the
age of the firm (Miller and Chen, 1996). For example, Hambrick et al (1996) found that
heterogenous top management teams exhibited greater propensity for action and that their
actions were of substantial magnitude but that they were less likely to respond to
competitors’ moves and that they were slower in both actions and responses. Miller and
Chen (1994) found that good past performance contributed to competitive inertia, that is,
lower levels of competitive activity.
Sequences
Ferrier (2001) conceptualized strategy as a sequence of competitive actions
carried out over time. The key difference between a repertoire and sequence is that the
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latter accounts for the actual order and timing of competitive moves. The study found that
aggressive sequential thrusts of competitive moves can result in market share gain
relative to rivals, especially if they are prolonged, and that these in turn were influenced
by top management team heterogeneity, past performance, slack, and industry
characteristics like barriers to entry and concentration. Later research (Rindova, Ferrier
and Wiltbank, 2010), found that properties of sequences of competitive actions impacted
how investors made sense of firms’ competitive behavior and subsequent valuations for
those firms.
While studies at the different levels of action aggregation noted above have
produced results that strongly confirm that different dimensions of competitive behavior
relate to firm performance, one of the most consistent findings across studies is a positive
relationship between higher levels of competitive activity and firm performance (Chen
and Miller, 2012; Smith et al 2001). This finding is consistent with the Austrian views
articulated earlier that emphasize the role of purposeful action by entrepreneurs in the
market process. Given that larger levels of competitive activity have generally been
found to have a positive relationship with firm performance, scholars have been naturally
interested in the antecedents to such competitive activity.
Antecedents to Competitive Action
Broadly, antecedents that have been identified may be grouped into four
categories – (1) structural properties of industries and engagement in markets, (2)
organizational, (3) relational, and (4) cognitive and psychological antecedents. I review
the first three classes of antecedents in this sub-section and devote a separate sub-section
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to cognitive and psychological antecedents, given that that is the area to which my
dissertation contributes.
Structural properties of industries and engagement in markets
Porter (1979, 137) noted that “the essence of strategy formulation is coping with
competition” and that “the state of competition in an industry depends on five basic
forces.” Porter went on to emphasize the role of entry barriers, the bargaining power of
buyers and suppliers, the threat of substitute products, and the extent of jockeying among
incumbents as determining both the nature and degree of competition within an industry.
The Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm in industrial organization economics
formed the theoretical basis for many of these predictions (Sherer and Ross, 1990).
Porter’s original predictions subsequently found strong empirical support. For example,
Porter predicted that low industry growth would precipitate greater competition and that
high concentration would result in low competitive activity and subsequent research
largely confirmed these predictions (Schomburg, Grimm and Smith 1994, Young et al,
1996). Ferrier (2001) found that firms in competition-buffered industry environments
carried out fewer actions and Schomburg et al (1994) found that firms in industries with
low barriers to entry engaged in larger numbers of competitive actions.
In addition, Caves and Porter (1977) introduced the notion of “mobility barriers”.
They noted that industries consisted of strategic groups. For example, in the airline
industry, hub-and-spoke (e.g. United) and point-to-point carriers (e.g. Southwest) have
markedly different strategies and belong to different groups within the industry. They
noted that firms would face barriers when moving across strategic groups and that higher
mobility barriers would attenuate competition across groups.
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Scholars have also been keenly interested in properties of markets that impact
propensity for action and properties of repertoires. For example, Miller and Chen found
(1994) that firms that competed in diverse markets were likelier to engage in tactical
actions, and that firms that competed in fast-growing markets were likelier to engage in
strategic actions. Miller and Chen (1996) found that diverse markets were negatively
related to simplicity within competitive repertoires.
Aspects of the legal and institutional environment have had a major impact on the
extent of competition as well (Scherer and Ross, 1990). For example, the Sherman Act,
which was passed in 1890, explicitly prohibited firms from collusion, thereby lowering
the opportunity for firms to form certain types of collaborative agreements that mitigated
competition. In addition, anti-trust law has been strongly concerned with high levels of
industry concentration and possible price-fixing (Salop and White, 1988). The
importance of the legal and regulatory environment is underscored in a study by Smith
and Grimm (1987). They studied responses to firms following railroad deregulation and
found that most firms changed strategies following deregulation and that the firms that
did change outperformed those that did not.
Given that firms often meet each other in more than one market, research within
the area of multi-market contact (Yu and Cannella, 2013) has studied how contact across
multiple markets impacts firms’ propensities to launch action against one another. The
foundation for this research was laid by the economist Edwards (1955) who suggested
that firms that meet each other in multiple markets were likely to exercise forbearance in
acting against each other because of the fear of retaliation across multiple markets.
Economists later noted that certain conditions were necessary for mutual forbearance to
17

come into effect, e.g. heterogenous firms, markets and competitive advantages (Bernheim
and Whinston, 1990).
Consistent with forbearance arguments, Chen (1996) theorized that market
commonality, or the degree to which a rival is a significant player in markets important to
a focal firm, would attenuate the likelihood that the focal firm would launch action
against that rival. A slew of studies has tested how contact across multiple markets
impacts firms’ propensities to launch competitive action against rivals (Baum and Korn,
1996, 1999; Gimeno and Woo, 1996, 1999; Yu, Subramaniam and Cannella, 2009).
While the forbearance proposition has found broad support, there is increased interest in
contingencies that moderate the forbearance hypothesis (e.g. Yu et al, 2009). It is also
worth noting that, while the term “mutual forbearance” has often been used, scholars
clearly recognize the possibility of asymmetry, that is, that a firm’s pressure to forbear
from attacking a rival may not be the same as the pressure felt by the rival to forbear from
attacking the focal firm (Chen, 1996).
Organizational Antecedents
Scholars have noted several organizational antecedents including slack (Ferrier,
2001), TMT characteristics (Ferrier, 2001; Hambrick et al, 1996) and size (Chen and
Hambrick, 1995) as impacting the propensity for competitive behavior. For example,
Chen and Hambrick (1995) found that small firms had higher levels of competitive
activity but that they were low-key and secretive when executing actions. Many of these
studies have also theorized and tested links between levels of competitive activity and
firm performance, generally finding a positive link.
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Scholars have also examined the influence of organizational characteristics like
past performance, age and structural complexity. Chen, Katila, McDonald and Eisenhardt
found (2010) that the relationship between past performance and subsequent competitive
moves depended on the type of market. They found that, while high-performers were
conservative in established markets and bold in new ones, low performers were bold in
established markets and conservative in new ones. While many scholars have theorized
that age should lead firms to carry out narrower repertoires of actions that worked in the
past and fewer actions, empirical findings have not found consistent support for this
argument (e.g. Miller and Chen, 1994, 1996). In a study within the airline industry,
Smith, Grimm, Gannon and Chen found (1991) that structural complexity of firms was
negatively related to the propensity to respond to competitors’ moves.
Hambrick, Cho and Chen (1996) found that top management teams that were
heterogenous in functional backgrounds, company tenure, and education exhibited
stronger propensity for action and that the actions were of substantial magnitude, but that
they were slower in carrying out those actions. In this context, an area that deserves
mention is upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hayward and Hambrick,
1997; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007). While not explicitly situated within the
competitive dynamics literature, a slew of studies has confirmed that the personality,
values and experiences of top managers (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) impact their
propensity for specific types of competitive actions. For example, Hayward and
Hambrick (1997) noted that CEOs with hubris, or exaggerated self-confidence, tended to
pay higher premiums for acquisitions and Chatterjee and Hambrick noted (2007) that
narcissistic CEOs were likelier to take bold, visible and grandiose actions like large
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acquisitions. Finally, scholars have also been interested in how ownership structure
influences different dimensions of competitive behavior. Connelly et al found (2017) that
firms with dedicated institutional owners tended to carry out more complex repertoires.
Relational Antecedents
Several scholars (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 2011; Gnyawali, He and
Madhavan, 2006; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001) have noted that competition is often
embedded within networks of co-operation. In fact, the phenomenon is widespread as
several firm alliances are between competitors (Ketchen, Snow and Hoover, 2004). In
this context, studies have found links between firms’ positions in networks of
collaboration and their propensity to launch competitive action. For example, Gnyawali
et al (2006) found that a focal firm’s centrality in the network of collaborative
relationships impacted volume of competitive actions.
Cognitive and Psychological Antecedents
Since the mid-2000s, competitive dynamics scholars have become more keenly
interested in the cognitive and psychological antecedents to competitive action. Unlike
the rest of strategy and organization theory, where notions of psychology impacting
strategic decision-making are quite old (Cyert and March, 1963; Hambrick and Mason,
1984), competitive dynamics has only more recently emphasized the role of cognition
and psychology as antecedents to competitive action. While some past work (Porac and
Thomas, 1990; Porac et al 1995; Reger and Huff, 1993) did emphasize a cognitive aspect
in how firms defined strategic groups, that work did not recognize the large variance in
competitive perceptions across firm-rival dyads within a strategic group. Chen et al
(2007) raised this concern and introduced the notion of competitive tension, which they
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defined as the “strain between a focal firm and a rival that is likely to result in the firm
taking action against the rival”. They found competitive tension to be influenced by
factors such as the rival’s scale, attack volume and capability to contest.
Livengood and Reger (2010) introduced the notion of identity domain, which they
defined as “members’ consensual understanding of the competitive arena that best
demonstrates and reinforces organizational identity in the marketplace.” They theorized
that a firm’s identity domain impacts proclivity to act or to respond to rivals’ actions.
Nadkarni and Barr (2008) theorized and found that managerial cognition mediated
the relationship between industry characteristics and competitive behavior. Specifically,
they found that industry velocity influenced the structure of top management’s
representation of the environment, which in turn influenced the speed with which they
acted on environmental events.
Kilduff et al (2010), advanced the notion of “rivalry as a psychological
phenomenon.” They argued that the “subjective intensity of rivalry” was influenced by
such factors as prior competitive interactions and similarity in attributes. They tested and
found support for these ideas on data from NCAA basketball.
Collectively, these studies have laid a foundation for a deeper examination of
cognitive and psychological factors that drive competitive action. In my dissertation, I
contribute to this stream of research by examining the role of a new psychological
antecedent – status. I proceed to review the stimulus-response model within social
cognition, that I use when building theory in my dissertation.
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Stimulus-Response Model
Broadly, the stimulus-response model within social cognition (Dutton and
Duncan, 1987; Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Keisler and Sproull, 1982) is a framework that
helps build theory on how organizational decision-makers respond to various stimuli.
Indeed, its variant, the Awareness-Motivation-Capability, or AMC framework (Chen,
1996; Chen et al, 2007), described in greater detail below, has been extensively used by
competitive dynamics scholars when studying antecedents to competitive action and
response. The stimulus-response model highlights two processes as vital to how
organizational decision-makers respond to the stimuli that confront them. First, given that
strategic decision-makers are bombarded with stimuli and have limited cognitive
capacity, they selectively choose to pay attention to just some of those stimuli (Cyert and
March, 1963; Keisler and Sproull, 1982; Simon, 1957). Second, once they have selected
out stimuli to focus their attention upon, they interpret those stimuli, that is, they infuse
stimuli with meaning (Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Keisler and Sproull, 1982). That in turn
determines how they respond to the selected stimuli.
While the above is a broad framework, scholars have been keenly interested in
exactly what determines which stimuli decision-makers pay attention to and how they
infuse those stimuli with meaning. Work in the first stream has, for example, unearthed
aspiration-level triggers (Cyert and March, 1963), market commonality (Chen, 1996), and
identity domains (Livengood and Reger, 2010) as determining which stimuli decisionmakers pay attention to. Work in the second stream has, for example, studied factors like
CEOs’ personality, values and experiences (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Chin,
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Hambrick and Trevino, 2013; Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and problem framing (Dutton
and Jackson, 1987; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
A theoretical framework that is derived from the stimulus-response model in
social cognition and that has been widely used in competitive dynamics research is the
Awareness-Motivation-Capability, or AMC framework (Chen, 1996; Chen et al, 1992;
Livengood and Reger, 2010). This framework recognizes that a firm’s decision to act or
respond to a competitor’s move is based on the firm’s level of awareness, motivation to
act, and its capability, that is, its stock of resources. While awareness is a pre-requisite
for a competitive move (Chen, 1996), motivation and capability determine whether a firm
would launch competitive action or respond to an action from a rival (Chen, 1996; Chen
et al, 2007). Competitive Dynamics scholars have often viewed awareness, motivation
and capability as the three key drivers of competitive action and have used it to build
theory on how specific factors would influence firms’ proclivities to act or respond to the
moves of other firms (Chen, 1996; Chen et al, 1992; Chen et al, 2007; Livengood and
Reger, 2010). For example, Chen et al (1992) used the framework in developing theory
to predict how firms would respond to actions from rivals. Chen (1996) used the AMC
framework in predicting the effects of market commonality and resource similarity on
motivation to compete and respond to rival’s moves, and Chen et al (2007) used the
framework in predicting how a rival’s relative scale, attack volume and capability to
contest influence the tension, or strain, a focal firm perceives about a rival.
More recent research has made an important conceptual refinement to the AMC
perspective. Livengood and Reger noted (2010) that many past studies looked at
awareness, motivation and capability in isolation from one another. For example, Chen
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(1996) saw market commonality as influencing awareness and motivation and resource
similarity as influencing capability. Chen et al (2007) saw a rival’s relative scale as
influencing awareness and the rival’s attack volume as influencing motivation. However,
Livengood and Reger (2010) noted that awareness, motivation and capability can
influence each other in subtle ways. For example, a focal firm’s motivation to launch
action against a high-status rival may be attenuated by its recognition of the possibility of
retaliation and of the high-status rival having access to greater capabilities and resources.
It is this more recent gestalt perspective that I adopt in my dissertation.
In addition, I assume that awareness is not dichotomous but varies along a
continuum. There is a clear difference between a situation where decision makers have a
cursory awareness of a rival and one where they closely follow that rival’s moves and
actions, that is, they watch the rival closely and the rival is salient to them. Awareness in
my dissertation thus refers to the extent of attention (Ocasio, 1997) that a firm bestows
upon a rival. In my dissertation, my interest is in examining how a rival’s market
commonality with a focal firm and the rival’s status relative to the focal firm and their
interactions influence a focal firm’s awareness of and motivation to launch action against
the rival.
In past research in competitive dynamics, awareness and motivation have mostly
been inferred from observations of patterns of competitive actions and responses (e.g.
Chen et al, 1992; Chen et al, 2007). There is no study that has explicitly measured
awareness and motivation. My dissertation sets a precedent within competitive dynamics
research by measuring these two variables through a survey as opposed to inferring them
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from patterns of competitive actions and responses. Measuring these variables directly
helps lend credence to theorizing based on the AMC framework.
While I do theorize the role of capability as well, I do not measure “hard”
capabilities explicitly. In the empirical context of food trucks in Lexington, there is
certainly variance in “soft” resources such as status as well as on dimensions such as
social capital, particularly relationships with location owners. These form an explicit
focus of my study. However, there is far less variance in “hard” resources and capabilities
as have been typically operationalized in other competitive dynamics studies (e.g. Chen,
1996; Chen et al, 2007). For example, in their empirical context of the airline industry,
Chen et al (2007) consider fleet structure in attempting to determine whether two airlines
have similar bundles of resources and capabilities. While they serve different types of
food, there is relatively much less variance among food trucks in Lexington on
dimensions such as sophistication of equipment and technology and scale.
While I use the AMC framework in building theory in my dissertation, I also use
a framework developed by Dutton and Jackson (1987) that extends the stimulus-response
model to incorporate cognitive categorization theory (Mervis and Rosch, 1981; Rosch
and Mervis, 1975). Dutton and Jackson (1987) contend that, when infusing stimuli with
meaning, two broad categories that strategic decision-makers assign stimuli to are
“opportunity” and “threat”. Stimuli that are positive and perceived as gain situations and
where decision-makers feel in control are labeled “opportunities” and those that are
negative or loss situations and where decision-makers do not feel in control are labeled
“threats”. Dutton and Jackson (1987) posit that situations classified as opportunities are
likelier to elicit externally directed actions (such as competitive actions).
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In my dissertation, I posit that a rival’s relative status and market commonality
with a focal firm act together to determine whether the focal firm perceives the situation
with respect to that rival as an opportunity or threat and that that in turn predicts the focal
firm’s motivation to launch action against the rival. While I use Dutton and Jackson’s
framework, I note that all hypotheses are fully consistent with the AMC framework too.
Where I employ Dutton and Jackson’s model, I also apply the AMC framework in
parallel and arrive at the same hypotheses.
I focus on a new cognitive and psychological antecedent to competitive action –
status. There is an interesting and unresolved puzzle in this context. While past research
has laid out very clearly that high-status firms enjoy several benefits (Benjamin and
Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1993; Podolny, 2001; Washington and Zajac, 2005), there has
been nearly no consideration of lower-status firms’ competitive reactions to a high-status
firm’s privileges. If high-status firms were to come under competitive attack from lowerstatus firms, that may undermine the extent to which they can continue to enjoy their
privileges.
On the one hand, it is plausible that low-status firms are more aware of and more
motivated to compete with higher-status rivals but on the other hand, the greater
capability of higher-status firms to garner resources and capabilities in the event of a war
(Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Merton, 1968; Podolny, 1993) should make lower-status
firms fear retaliation. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence from the business world does
indicate that higher-status firms often come under attack from lower-status ones, as did
General Motors from Toyota in the 1960s and 70s and IBM from Lenovo in the 1990s.
Given the several examples from the business world of low-status firms launching
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competitive moves against high-status ones makes one wonder why those specific lowstatus firms were less concerned with retaliation. In my dissertation, I help to solve this
puzzle by examining the role of structural properties of market engagement as a
contingency that helps predict when lower-status firms become motivated to act against
high-status ones (and vice-versa).
Status
In this section, I begin by providing a definition and detailed description of status
as it applies to theory development within my dissertation. I then distinguish it from
related concepts like reputation, legitimacy and celebrity. Following that, I provide a
brief review of the literature on status in the context of firms and consider the role status
plays in strategy research in general. I then consider predictions that extant research
makes on status and motivation to launch competitive action, ending with a puzzle that
my dissertation helps solve.
Definition and Meaning of Status
Status, which has its roots in sociology and social psychology, refers to an actor’s
relative esteem, prestige, respect and social standing in the eyes of other actors within a
collective (Chen et al, 2012; Magee and Galinsky, 2008). Status as just defined is known
to exist at multiple levels – individuals (Bendersky and Shah, 2012), groups (Tajfel and
Turner, 1986) and firms (Podolny, 1993; 2001) and is known to have consequences for
outcomes important to organizational and management research at each of those levels.
My dissertation is primarily concerned with status hierarchies among firms.
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It is important to note that, in the context of firms, financial performance and the
actual (as opposed to perceived) quality of goods and services are only loosely coupled
with status, endowing the term “status” with a distinct conceptual significance. Podolny
noted (1993) that because status is based on such factors as a producer’s ties to other
market participants, as well as on several signals as for example charitable donations and
market share, it is often only loosely coupled with the actual quality of goods and
services. Washington and Zajac noted (2005) that because factors like history and
networks are important to the emergence of status, status hierarchies are not necessarily
strongly correlated with hierarchies based on past performance either.
However, scholars have found that possessing high-status has major positive
consequences for firms, given that status plays a signaling role when exchange partners
are confronted with uncertainty (Podolny 1993; 2001), that other market participants are
likely to seek associations with high-status firms (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999) and that
high-status producers have lower advertising costs because consumers are likely to be
aware of their product and service offerings (Podolny, 1993).
It is important to note that status is a perceptual phenomenon and that status
hierarchies are actively constructed in the minds of those who observe the concerned
firms (Magee and Galinsky, 2008; Piazza and Castellucci, 2014). While certainly there
can be variation in how individuals perceive a status hierarchy, there is generally a strong
consensual agreement of a status hierarchy that is inter-subjectively agreed upon and
stable (Graffin et al, 2013; Magee and Galinsky, 2008; Weber, 1978; Zajac and
Washington, 2005).
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Finally, Chen et al note (2012) that status may be achieved by one of two means –
dominance or prestige. While dominance-based status is achieved through means such as
aggression and coercion, prestige-based status is based on respect, admiration and
deference, and, in the context of firms, achieved through means such as history
(Washington and Zajac, 2005) and associations (Podolny, 1993; Benjamin and Podolny,
1999). Status as I refer to it in this dissertation is prestige-based.
Status and Related Concepts
I note that status as I define it is distinct from three other concepts – reputation,
celebrity and legitimacy. While the concept of status is rooted in sociology and social
psychology, reputation is rooted in economics (Piazza and Castellucci, 2014). Firms build
a reputation for specific aspects of their products and services (Sorenson, 2014). Building
a reputation consists of emitting signals that satisfy two properties (Spence, 1973; 1974)
– (1) the signal is at least partly within the firm’s control and (2) it is less expensive for a
firm that is strong on the specific dimension on which it seeks to build a reputation to
emit the signal in comparison with a firm that is weak on that dimension. For example,
firms build reputations for the quality of their products by offering warranties on them,
with warranties satisfying the criteria for signals as noted above. Reputation as just
outlined is different from status because status refers to position within a social hierarchy.
While some past research has confounded the two, scholars increasingly recognize that
they are different concepts (Sorenson, 2014).
Also, the concept of status is different from that of legitimacy. Legitimacy is
rooted in institutional theory and refers to conformance with prevailing norms and
cultural beliefs (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). A firm can be a legitimate entity without
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being high-status. Finally, status is distinct from celebrity, which refers to a “dramatized
reality constructed by the media” (Rindova, Pollock and Hayward, 2006). A high-status
firm is not necessarily a celebrated firm.
I choose to study status because extant research in status within sociology and
social psychology clearly points to status influencing awareness, motivation and
capability, the three key drivers of competitive action. It is well-known that high-status
actors are more closely watched (Anderson et al, 2001; Kovacs and Sharkey, 2014),
pointing to the role of status in influencing firms’ awareness of rivals. Research also
points to status hierarchies impacting the motivation to act against others, although
arguments are equivocal with one school suggesting greater motivation to launch action
against actors of similar status (Magee and Galinsky, 2008) and another suggesting
greater motivation against higher status actors (Washington and Zajac, 2005). Finally,
status is well-known to influence the ability to garner resources and capabilities (Merton,
1968) and is a resource itself given that it is valuable, rare, hard-to-imitate and nonsubstitutable (Barney, 1991). Although extant research clearly points to status influencing
awareness, motivation and capability, there has been little systematic study of the role of
status in influencing competitive behavior among firms (a notable exception is
Washington and Zajac (2005)).
Status in the Context of Firms
Although status has a long history in sociology and social psychology, it was the
work of Podolny and colleagues that laid the foundation for subsequent research in the
context of firms and markets. Podolny (1993, p. 830) defined status as “the perceived
quality of a producer’s products in relation to the perceived quality of that producer’s
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competitors’ products,” emphasizing the role of status as a signal of quality. Some
scholars (e.g. Piazza and Castellucci, 2014) have noted that Podolny’s definition of status
is somewhat confounded with reputation (as there is no mention of a rank order or
hierarchy). Nevertheless, Podolny highlighted that status hierarchies are decoupled from
actual quality for several reasons. First, he noted that purchasers of a higher-status
producer’s products would remain unaware of changes to the quality of a lower-status
producer’s products because they would not encounter the products from the lower-status
producer. Second, status is determined at least partly by a firm’s ties with other market
participants. Finally, status is based on several signals including assets, charitable
contributions and market share. Importantly, he noted that status position circumscribed
revenue and cost profiles for a producer. Not only do high-status producers have better
revenue opportunities given that status is a signal of quality and something valued in and
of itself, but high-status producers have advantages on the cost side as well including
lower transaction costs (since status serves as a signal of quality) and advertising costs
(since market participants tend to be already aware of high-status producers).
Benjamin and Podolny (1999) subsequently studied over 10,000 affiliation
decisions made by 595 wineries over a ten-year period. They found that high-status
wineries derived greater benefit from subsequent high-status affiliations than did lowstatus wineries. Notions of reputation in economics hold that investments in quality at a
given point in time affect market opportunities at a subsequent time. Their study
contrasted economic notions of reputation with the sociological notion of status and
found that investments in quality benefit higher-status producers more than they do
lower-status ones. Podolny (2001), used an empirical sample of venture-capital firms and
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found that the value of status increased with the uncertainty confronted by a firm’s
exchange partners.
While several studies have subsequently examined status in the context of firms
and markets, I note prominent examples. Some studies have examined status in the
context of inter-firm alliances. For example, Chung, Singh and Lee (2000) found status
similarity to be linked to alliance formation. McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001)
found similar results and noted that especially in the face of uncertainty, organizations
formed exchange relations with other similar-status organizations. Stuart, Hoang and
Hybels (1999) found that young firms that had high-status alliance partners performed
better than young firms that did not possess such partners. On the other hand, Jensen
(2006), introduced the concept of “status anxiety.” He studied client defections from the
accounting firm Arthur Andersen following a well-publicized scandal and found that
concerns about being devalued motivated firms to dissociate themselves from a tainted
firm.
An important study on status is that by Washington and Zajac (2005). Using an
empirical sample from NCAA basketball, this study found that, when controlling for
recent performance, the basketball teams that enjoyed high-status privileges were those
that had an appropriate historical legacy and perceived affiliations with other high-status
teams. An important conclusion from the study is that because status is influenced by
such factors as history and networks, it is often decoupled from performance, making it
important and interesting to study status as an independent construct.
Collectively, work on status in the context of firms points to several benefits that
firms come to acquire from possessing high-status and having ties to other high-status
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firms. High-status firms have opportunities on both the revenue (Podolny, 1993) and cost
(Podolny, 1993, 2001) fronts, realize better gains from investments in acquiring resources
and capabilities (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999), and from other market participants
wanting to form ties with them (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Washington and Zajac,
2005).
Specifically, in the context of research within strategic management, status seems
to play two noteworthy roles. First, status may be considered a resource that firms
possess (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). It is often valuable and rare. In addition, status
is inimitable. The inimitability may stem from any of the mechanisms described in
Barney (1991) – unique historical conditions, causal ambiguity and social complexity.
While history is known to play into status (Podolny, 1993; Washington and Zajac, 2005),
there is also some element of causal ambiguity as it is not fully clear how actors come to
attain status. Finally, status is socially complex given that it derives from affiliations and
positions within social networks (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1993, 2001).
Second, status may also be considered a mobility barrier (Caves and Porter, 1977) as a
key feature of high-status firms is that they occupy premium niches within a market that
are hard for other firms to penetrate (Merton, 1968; Podolny, 1993).
Status and Motivation to Launch Competitive Action
Extant research makes equivocal predictions on how status influences the
motivation to launch competitive action against other firms. Social hierarchies in general
perform two major functions – (1) provide incentives and (2) facilitate co-ordination
(Magee and Galinsky, 2008). Because social hierarchies perform these functions,
significant evidence indicates that even lower-status actors are often likely to exhibit a
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psychological tendency to rationalize the status quo and accept the positions of higherstatus actors (Jost and Banaji, 1994; Jost et al 1994). In addition, there is strong evidence
to indicate that higher-status actors have an advantage in the pursuit of opportunities
(Merton, 1968; Podolny, 1993) which would automatically create disincentives for lowstatus actors when they attempt to compete with high-status ones. For example, Podolny
noted (1993, 2001) that high-status firms face lower transaction and advertising costs and
that their status has signaling value when exchange partners are confronted with
uncertainty. Finally, scholars generally predict that the opposite situation of high-status
firms launching competitive action against lower-status ones is unlikely to occur as that
may dilute their status and make them less exclusive (Podolny, 1993; Washington and
Zajac, 2005). These reasons are often collectively cited to explain why status hierarchies
become self-fulfilling and sticky and relatively uncontested (Magee and Galinsky, 2008).
On the other hand, a significant stream of research indicates that higher-status
actors are likelier to be watched by others (Anderson et al, 2001; Graffin et al, 2013) and
envied (Fiske, 2011). In addition, several studies have explicitly documented status
conflicts (Bendersky and Hays, 2012; Gould, 2003; He and Huang, 2011). Moreover,
there is no dearth of examples in the media of low-status firms within an industry
launching competitive moves that challenge higher-status rivals and interestingly, highstatus firms attack lower-status rivals too sometimes.
A natural puzzle in this context is when and under what circumstances each of
these views applies. Are status hierarchies self-fulfilling, sticky and relatively
uncontested? Or are high-status firms likely to come under attack from lower-status ones?
Although some scholars (Gould, 2003; He and Huang, 2011) have tried to resolve the
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puzzle by suggesting that ambiguity within status hierarchies may breed conflict, there
are several scenarios in the business world where clear status hierarchies too are
contested. In the PC industry, for example, Lenovo did not hesitate to make moves to
enter IBM’s markets in the 1990s despite IBM being a clearly higher-status firm. In my
dissertation, I help to solve this puzzle by theorizing and testing the role of market
commonality as a contingency in the relationship between the relative status of a rival
and a focal firm’s motivation to launch competitive action against the rival.
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THEORY
As noted earlier, both streams of research - competitive dynamics and status,
leave open unanswered puzzles about the relationship between a rival’s status relative to
a focal firm and the focal firm’s motivation to launch competitive action against that
rival. The first puzzle is from a competitive dynamics perspective. Given that extant
research points to high-status entities garnering greater attention in general (Graffin et al,
2013; Kovacs and Sharkey, 2014), it must follow that firms generally pay greater
attention to high-status rivals. Applying the AMC framework, high-status rivals are thus
likely to pass the awareness filter of lower-status firms.
However, the relative status of a rival with respect to a focal firm has opposing
effects on the motivation and capability components. A lower-status firm should be
motivated to launch competitive action against a high-status rival, as doing so would rub
off positively on the focal firm’s status (Washington and Zajac, 2005) and there are clear
economic (Podolny, 1993) and psychological (Kilduff et al, 2010) benefits to winning a
battle with a high-status rival. However, given that status is linked to the ability to garner
resources and capabilities (Merton, 1968; Podolny, 1993), a lower-status firm should
perceive itself as being less capable of attack, given the possibility of retaliation. That
should in turn exert downward pressure on motivation to act. As noted earlier, however,
there are several examples from the business world of lower-status firms launching
competitive moves against high-status rivals, throwing open the question of why those
specific lower-status firms were less concerned with retaliation.
The second puzzle originates in the literature on status. It is well known that highstatus actors in general come to receive greater opportunities and rewards (Merton, 1968)
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and that high-status producers have advantages on both the revenue and cost fronts
(Podolny, 1993). That should automatically create disincentives for lower-status
producers who want to compete with higher-status ones. In addition, most current
research almost universally assumes that the opposite phenomenon of a high-status firm
attempting to compete with a lower-status one would result in the former losing some of
the privileges of exclusivity and status (Podolny, 1993; Washington and Zajac, 2005).
Extant research would thus predict that high-status firms have disincentives from
attempting to launch action against lower-status ones as well. Collectively, these
arguments paint a picture of status hierarchies being sticky, self-fulfilling and relatively
uncontested (Magee and Galinsky, 2008).
Another strand of research (e.g. Bendersky and Hays, 2012; Gould, 2003; He and
Huang, 2011), however, explicitly discusses status conflicts and several anecdotal
examples from the business world point to high-status firms facing the possibility of
attack from lower-status ones. Although some scholars, notably Gould (2003), have
suggested that ambiguity within status hierarchies sparks conflict, many anecdotal
examples of conflict in the business world arise within very clear status hierarchies.
Research in status thus does not seem to be fully equipped to answer the question of
when and under what circumstances lower-status firms become motivated to compete
with higher-status ones and vice-versa.
In my dissertation, I help to solve these puzzles by theorizing and testing the role
of structural properties of market engagement (Baum and Korn, 1999; Chen, 1996) as a
contingency that predicts when lower-status firms become motivated to compete with
higher-status ones and vice-versa. I bring the literatures in competitive dynamics, status
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and multi-market contact together using the stimulus-response model in social cognition.
My theoretical model is depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Theoretical Model
As depicted above, several key predictions emerge from my model. First, I predict
that a rival’s market commonality with a focal firm is positively related to awareness,
which in my dissertation refers to the attention the focal firm pays to the rival. Second, I
predict that a rival’s market commonality with a focal firm is negatively related to the
focal firm’s motivation to launch action against that rival. Third, I predict that a rival’s
status relative to a focal firm is positively related to the focal firm’s awareness of the
rival. Fourth, I predict that a rival’s market commonality with a focal firm interacts
negatively with the rival’s status relative to the focal firm to predict the focal firm’s
motivation to launch action against the rival and finally, I predict that a rival’s market
commonality with a focal firm interacts positively with the rival’s status relative to the
focal firm to predict the attention the focal firm pays to the rival.
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The rest of my theory section is organized into three sections. The first section
develops theory that makes predictions on the main effects of a rival’s market
commonality with a focal firm on the focal firm’s awareness of and motivation to launch
action against the rival. The second section makes predictions on the main effects of the
relative status of a rival on the focal firm’s awareness and motivation, noting the
conflicting predictions with motivation. In the third and final section, I develop theory
that makes predictions on the interactive effects of market commonality and rival’s
relative status on a focal firm’s awareness of and motivation to launch action.
Market Commonality
As noted earlier, a framework that competitive dynamics scholars have often used
when attempting to analyze the impact of different antecedents on competitive action and
response is the Awareness-Motivation-Capability framework (Chen, 1996; Chen et al,
1992). A basic premise is that a firm’s decision to act or respond to a rival’s action is
based on three key drivers – the extent to which the firm is aware of the rival, is
motivated to act or respond to the rival, and is capable of acting or responding to the
rival.
In applying the AMC framework in past competitive dynamics research, scholars
have treated awareness, motivation and capability in slightly different ways. For example,
Chen et al (1992) referred to them as they applied to competitive actions, that is, in
predicting competitive response, they held that characteristics of the initial competitive
action would impact the extent to which a firm became aware of the action, was
motivated to respond to it, and perceived itself as capable of doing so. In a similar vein,
Marcel, Barr and Duhaime (2011) considered cues embedded within competitive actions.
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Chen (1996) and Chen et al (2007) however, used it to mean awareness of, motivation to
launch action against and capable of acting against a specific rival. Livengood and Reger
(2010) applied the terms more broadly and used them to refer to awareness of, motivation
to respond to, and capability to respond to specific threats, actions and firms. In my
dissertation, I use the terms in a similar manner to Chen (1996) and Chen et al (2007) and
refer to awareness of, motivation and capability to act against a specific rival. I do so as,
like Chen (1996) and Chen et al (2007), my theoretical interest is predicting awareness
and motivation at the level of the firm-dyad. I also note that I use the term “rival” to refer
broadly to any other firm within the broader business context. “Rival” in my dissertation
thus refers to any potential rival and not necessarily to a salient one or to one whose
defeat involves psychological stakes for a focal firm as articulated, for example, in
Kilduff et al (2010).
In addition, while past studies within competitive dynamics have theorized the
role of awareness, motivation and capability, no study has measured these variables. For
example, past research has theorized that contact across multiple markets decreases the
motivation for competitive action against a rival and has found that multi-market contact
does lower market entry and exit rates and proclivity for action in general (Baum and
Korn, 1996, 1999; Gimeno and Woo, 1996, 1999, Yu et al, 2009). However, the absence
of operationalization and measurement of the motivation variable allows, for example,
the possibility of an unobserved third variable simultaneously influencing both multimarket contact and propensity for competitive action. A key advancement in my
dissertation is that both theory and method focus on awareness and motivation as
outcome variables, thus enhancing validity.
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Before I proceed to develop theory leading to hypotheses predicting how market
commonality would influence both awareness of and motivation to launch action against
a rival, I review literature relevant to market commonality.
Literature Review
Market commonality refers to the extent to which a rival is a significant player in
markets important to a focal firm (Chen, 1996; Baum and Korn, 1999). The notion of
market commonality originated in the literature in multi-market contact (Baum and Korn,
1999; Bernheim and Whinston, 1990; Gimeno and Woo, 1996). It is very common for
firms to encounter each other in multiple geographic or product markets. Multi-market
contact refers to such scenarios, those where a given firm meets a rival in more than one
distinct market (Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985).
A key theoretical underpinning within multi-market contact research has been the
mutual forbearance hypothesis. Edwards (1955) noted that a firm that meets a rival in
multiple markets has a disincentive from competitive action against that rival in any of
those markets because of the fear of retaliation across multiple markets. In addition,
Simmel (1950) advanced the notion that firms that compete in multiple markets recognize
their dependence on one another and chalk out “spheres of influence.” Bernheim and
Whinston (1990) showed that mutual forbearance would not come into effect in the
presence of perfect monitoring and identical firms and markets and that it required firms
to have imperfect information and to be heterogenous and to compete in heterogenous
markets for collusive gains to emerge. Although the term “mutual forbearance” was
originally used to refer to this situation, later research clearly recognized asymmetry,
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meaning that a firm’s motivation to attack a rival may be different from that rival’s
motivation to attack the focal firm (Baum and Korn, 1999; Chen, 1996).
Several studies have supported the basic argument that multi-market contact
reduces rivalry. For example, Baum and Korn (1996), on a study of commuter airlines in
California, found that multi-market contact lowered airlines entry and exit from each
other’s markets. Baum and Korn eventually (1999) developed a more nuanced argument
and found support for an inverted U-shaped relationship between multi-market contact
and the rate of market entry and exit. The study, however, remained consistent with the
argument that high-levels of multi-market contact tend to exert a dampening effect on
rivalry. Gimeno and Woo found (1996) that increases in multi-market contact reduced
rivalry.
It follows from the above studies that market commonality, defined as the extent
to which a rival is a significant player in markets important to a focal firm, should
attenuate the focal firm’s motivation to launch action against the rival. Several studies
have tested this proposition and have generally found support (Baum and Korn, 1996,
1999; Gimeno and Woo, 1996; Yu et al, 2009). In addition, studies have theorized and
found that, while a focal firm may forbear from launching competitive action against a
rival that has high market commonality with the focal firm, the rival is likely to react
decisively and swiftly if the focal firm does launch competitive action (Chen, 1996;
Young et al, 2000; Yu and Cannella, 2007).
Scholars have been especially interested in contingencies that moderate the
forbearance hypothesis. For example, Jans and Rosenbaum (1997) found that the impact
of multi-market contact on forbearance was greater in more concentrated markets and
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Baum and Korn (1996) noted that the negative relationship between multi-market contact
and market entry and exit was even stronger in concentrated markets. Yu et al (2009)
found that government policy had an impact on the relationship between multi-market
contact and forbearance.
A contingency that is especially relevant to my dissertation is full observability.
Although there is some research that has examined the consequences of relaxing this
assumption (e.g. Greve, 2008), it is an assumption that pervades much research within
multi-market contact. In a recent review of the multi-market contact literature, Yu and
Cannella (2013) noted that past research has assumed that defections from equilibrium
can be perfectly detected and punished, and made a call for research that relaxes this
assumption. Status is known to be a cognitive heuristic in search (Kovacs and Sharkey,
2014) thus making it important to study its role in imperfect observability.
Market Commonality and Awareness
Awareness as I define it in my dissertation is the extent to which a firm pays
attention to and watches a given rival. Both the AMC framework and the underlying
stimulus-response model in social cognition posit that, before a stimulus (in this case the
presence of a rival) is processed and acted upon, it needs to pass a perceptual filter
(Dutton and Jackson, 1987), that is, it needs to have been noticed in the first place.
Indeed, Chen (1996) noted that awareness is a pre-requisite for a competitive move
against a rival. Given that decision makers have limited information processing capacity,
they are selective in what they perceive and use filters (Dearborn and Simon, 1958) in
deciding what to focus their attention upon. I assume that awareness of a rival is not
dichotomous but varies along a continuum. There is a clear difference between a situation
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where decision makers have a cursory awareness of a rival and one where they closely
follow that rival’s moves and actions, i.e., they watch the rival closely and the rival is
salient to them. Awareness in my dissertation thus refers to the extent of attention
(Ocasio, 1997) a firm bestows upon a rival.
In attempting to understand what determines which stimuli managers notice, some
research in the past emphasized aspiration-level triggers (Billings, Milburn and
Schaalman, 1980; Cyert and March, 1963) and detection errors because of a high “signalto-noise ratio” (Keisler and Sproull, 1982; Sproull, Weiner and Wolf, 1978). More
recently, organizational scholars have been keenly interested in how repeated competitive
interactions condition which rivals firms pay attention to (Johnson et al, 2006; Kilduff et
al, 2010). Although, as noted above, a situation where a rival has a major presence in
markets important to a focal firm is often characterized by less intense rivalry, and by the
firm and rival having chalked out “spheres of influence” (Baum and Korn, 1996, 1999;
Edwards, 1955; Gimeno and Woo, 1996, 1999), such an situation is often a reflection of a
settling down of past competitive encounters (Baum and Korn, 1999; Bernheim and
Whinston, 1990; Yu and Cannella, 2013). While a focal firm may forbear from launching
action against a rival that is a significant player in markets important to a focal firm, the
rival is nevertheless likely to be salient to the focal firm, that is the focal firm is likely to
be aware of the rival.
In experiments, Johnson and colleagues (2006) found that, when competitive
reward structures were set up and experimental conditions were then changed to reward
co-operation, participants continued to compete even though co-operation was in their
best interest. Extending these ideas, Kilduff et al (2010) theorized and found that the
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experience of competition leaves a “competitive residue” that persists after the battle has
ended. Once again, while it may be argued that high market commonality is accompanied
by less intense rivalry, and that firms competing in multiple markets may forbear from
launching action against each other, repeated engagement in markets is likely to make a
rival salient to a focal firm. A focal firm is thus likely to be strongly aware of a rival that
has a major presence in markets important to itself, even though it may forbear from
launching action against the rival. Consistent with this reasoning, Reger and Palmer
(1996) found inertia in firms’ categorization of competitors.
Given that it refers to the extent to which a rival is a significant player in markets
important to a focal firm, market commonality thus plays a major role in determining
which rivals a focal firm pays attention to. As noted above, given that decision-makers at
firms are boundedly rational (Cyert and March 1963), and possess finite cognitive
capabilities, they are unlikely to be paying attention to all possible competitors within a
business context. Research in competitive dynamics holds that market relationships
condition which rivals a focal firm notices and watches (Baum and Korn, 1999; Chen,
1996) so that rivals that have a strong presence in markets important to a focal firm are
likelier to be salient to that firm.
Hypothesis 1: A rival’s market commonality with a focal firm is positively related to the
focal firm’s awareness of the rival.
Market Commonality and Motivation
High market commonality which, as defined above, occurs when a rival is a
significant player in markets important to a focal firm, is generally believed to attenuate
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the focal firm’s motivation to launch competitive moves against the rival. Fear of
retaliation and subsequent impact on key markets would lead a focal firm to exercise
restraint when faced with a rival that it meets in multiple markets (Chen, 1996; Edwards,
1955). Baum and Korn (1996) summarized the argument as “Close competitors are not
the most intense rivals.” Firms that meet each other in multiple markets are likely to
recognize their interdependence and tacitly collude by allowing each other to be
superordinate in some markets in exchange for similar favorable treatment in other
markets (Baum and Korn, 1996; Edwards, 1955; Simmel, 1950). Mutual forbearance is
thus an implicit agreement to a “live-and-let-live” system.
Chen (1996) laid more nuance on this argument by emphasizing that forbearance
may not be mutual and that competition may be asymmetric. He drew on the work of
Tversky (1977) and laid out that statements of similarity are directional and depend on
which elements are the subject and referent. Applied to inter-firm competition, Chen
noted that firm A’s motivation to attack firm B may be very different from firm B’s
motivation to attack firm A. Competitive relationships are thus asymmetric. In my
dissertation, I explicitly account for the possibility of such asymmetry by treating the two
directions within a dyad as different. In fact, I illustrate eventually that the asymmetry has
interesting consequences for the emergence of inter-firm competition.
Bernheim and Whinston (1990) laid out several conditions for multi-market
contact to result in forbearance, implying that multi-market contact may not result in
collusive gains in all situations. For example, they laid out heterogenous markets, firms
and competitive advantages as necessary conditions. While there have been studies that
have investigated contingencies that moderate the mutual forbearance hypothesis (e.g.
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Greve, 2008; Yu et al, 2009), the broad view (summarized in Yu and Cannella, 2013)
that market commonality as I define in it in my dissertation has a dampening effect on
competition.
Hypothesis 2: A rival’s market commonality with a focal firm is negatively related to the
focal firm’s motivation to launch action against the rival.
Status
As already noted, extensive research within status does make predictions on how
it would influence a firm’s awareness of or motivation to launch action against a rival.
Although there is a significant literature on status hierarchies in the context of firms
(Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Chung et al, 2000; McPherson et al, 2001; Podolny, 1993;
Podolny, 2001; Washington and Zajac, 2005), a systematic examination of how status
hierarchies influence competitive behavior at the level of firms is, however, almost
completely missing. While competitive dynamics scholars recognize the importance of
competitive behavior for firm performance and the importance of cognitive and
psychological antecedents, there has not been an attempt to build a bridge between the
academic conversations of status scholars and those in competitive dynamics, despite
research in status pointing to several ways in which status hierarchies may influence
competitive behavior. This is a key and important gap that I seek to fill in my
dissertation.
In this section, I build theory which makes predictions on the main effects of
status on both awareness and motivation. As elucidated earlier, I note that the predictions
about motivation are equivocal, that is, two different schools of thought within status
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make conflicting predictions. In the subsequent section, I build theory which predicts that
considering the role of market commonality helps to resolve the conflict.
Relative Status of Rival and Awareness
As noted earlier, a basic premise underlying theory within social cognition is that
individuals have limited ability to process all the information they are confronted with
and thus use several criteria to narrow down what they pay attention to (Keisler and
Sproull, 1982; Simon, 1957). Prior research very strongly supports that status is such a
criterion and that higher-status actors are more closely watched. Anderson et al (2001, p.
117) noted that “status involves asymmetrical amounts of attention, such that those
higher in the hierarchy receive more attention than those lower in the hierarchy…higherstatus group members are more prominent and well-known and receive more scrutiny.”
Several studies have produced evidence confirming this effect (Graffin et al,
2013; Kovacs and Sharkey, 2014). Individuals are known to generally presume that status
is associated with higher quality in some respect, and that higher-status actors warrant
greater attention (Adut, 2008; Kovacs and Sharkey, 2014; Merton, 1968). For example,
Kovacs and Sharkey (2014) found that books that had won a coveted award received a
dramatic increase in readership, and from very broad audiences who would not have paid
attention to the books had they not won that award. Graffin et al (2013) found that
higher-status Members of British Parliament (MPs) were more likely to be targeted by
different audiences for an offense. They could empirically establish that the reason a
larger number of high-status MPs had to exit Parliament following a well-publicized
scandal was not because the high-status MPs were more likely to be opportunistic but
because they were more likely to be targeted for an offense.
48

It should follow then that, within a competitive context, higher-status firms should
garner more attention from other firms. Specifically, Kovacs and Sharkey (2014) note
that status acts as a heuristic in the process of screening, which entails identifying which
other entities are worthy of closer scrutiny. Status should thus serve as a heuristic when
deciding how much attention a firm pays to a rival, which leads me to my third
hypothesis.
In my dissertation, I use the term “rival’s relative status” or “rival’s status relative
to a focal firm” to imply a status difference that has both direction and magnitude. For
example, suppose firms A, B and C have statuses (on a hypothetical scale) of 1, 2 and 5.
Firm B is higher status relative to firm A but firm C is even higher status relative to firm
A. Likewise, firm B is low status relative to firm C but firm A is even lower status
relative to firm C.
Hypothesis 3: A rival’s status relative to a focal firm is positively related to the focal
firm’s awareness of the rival.
Relative Status of Rival and Motivation to Launch Action
While there is an extensive literature on status (summarized in Chen et al, 2012
and Piazza and Castellucci, 2014), and several arguments made within this literature
point to predictions on how a rival’s status relative to a focal firm would influence that
firm’s motivation to launch a competitive move against the rival, there has been no
systematic study in the context of firms. In addition, as noted earlier, consolidating the
various arguments leads to an interesting puzzle because the arguments make equivocal
predictions on how the relative status of a rival would impact a focal firm’s motivation to
launch action. Specifically, one set of arguments points to lower motivation to launch
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action against rivals that are above or below a focal firm within the status hierarchy and
would predict that the motivation is greatest when the rival is of approximately the same
status. However, the other prediction that emerges is that the greater the relative status of
a rival, the more strongly should a firm be motivated to launch a move against the rival. I
lay out these conflicting predictions as separate hypotheses. In the subsequent section, I
help to resolve the equivocal nature of the predictions by introducing the role of market
commonality as a contingency.
Several scholars (e.g. Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Merton, 1968; Podolny,
1993, 2001) maintain that high-status actors in general simply have an advantage when
competing with low-status ones which should automatically create disincentives for
lower-status actors. When laying out the well-known “Matthew Effect,” Merton, for
instance, noted (1968) that scientific discoveries that had the endorsement of a Nobel
prize winner were likely to be regarded more highly, making it harder for unknown junior
scientists to compete. Indeed, strong evidence in the context of firms shows that highstatus firms have greater access to revenue opportunities and possess advantages in
transaction and advertising costs (Podolny, 1993), that the signaling value of their highstatus endows them with advantages when exchange partners are confronted with
uncertainty (Podolny, 2001), and that even such actions as investments in improving
quality of products and services benefit high-status more than they do low-status ones
(Benjamin and Podolny, 1999).
Specifically, when applying the AMC framework (Chen, 1996; Chen et al, 2007),
these arguments would imply that low-status firms should be motivated to launch action
against high-status ones. Winning a war against a high-status rival is likely to result in a
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status boost and privileges for a low-status firm. However, when considering the
capability component within the AMC framework, the greater ability of the high-status
rivals to garner resources and capabilities would mean that low-status firms would be less
equipped to compete in the event of retaliation and may suffer damages. That should in
turn exert a dampening effect on a low-status firm’s motivation to compete with a higherstatus rival.
Over and above the fact that low-status firms face disadvantages when attempting
to compete with high-status rivals, a significant body of work asserts a social
psychological tendency for even low-status actors in general to accept the presence of the
hierarchy and perceive it as legitimate. One theory is especially relevant here – system
justification (Jost and Banaji, 1994; Jost et al, 1994). System justification theory posits
that even low-status actors, who stand to be disadvantaged, often exhibit a social
psychological tendency to accept the status hierarchy and perceive it as legitimate.
Underlying this rationalization of the status quo is the legitimating nature of hierarchies
in general. Moreover, the fact that hierarchies serve useful functions within human
societies, namely facilitating co-ordination and providing incentives, further exacerbates
“hierarchy enhancing belief systems” (Magee and Galinsky, 2008).
The arguments described above collectively point to low-status firms being less
inclined to launch competitive action against high-status rivals. In addition, a significant
stream of research notes that high-status firms in turn are unlikely to compete with lowstatus ones because of the possible dilution in exclusiveness and perceived quality that
would result (Podolny, 1993; Washington and Zajac, 2005). Collectively, this stream of
research points to status hierarchies being largely self-fulfilling and stable (Magee and
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Galinsky, 2008) and is consistent with some past studies that have found rivalry to be
greatest among similar status entities (Kilduff et al, 2010).
I also note that this hypothesis has an independent variable that differs from the
previous one and the hypotheses that follow. While the key independent variable in the
previous hypothesis and the ones that follow is rival’s status relative to a focal firm, or
relative status, as already defined, this hypothesis has similarity in status as the
independent variable. Unlike rival’s relative status, similarity in status has magnitude but
no direction. For example, if there are three firms A, B and C with status scores of 1, 2
and 5 on a hypothetical scale, A is more similar in status to B than is C. It is a measure of
the extent to which a rival is close to a focal firm in status, irrespective of higher or
lower.
Hypothesis 4a: The similarity in status between a focal firm and a rival is positively
related to the focal firm’s motivation to launch action against the rival.
On the other hand, there is significant evidence pointing to higher-status actors
being likelier targets of attacks from other actors (Bendersky and Hays, 2012; Flynn,
2003; Graffin et al, 2013; Huberman et al, 2004). While the greater awareness of highstatus firms would endow them with advantages in transactions with exchange partners, it
stands to reason that high-status firms are likely to be within the awareness zones of
rivals as well, given the earlier arguments that linked the relative status of a rival to
awareness. Adopting a gestalt view of the AMC framework (Livengood and Reger,
2010), the intense awareness of higher status actors should intensify the motivation to
launch action against them. In addition, research points to high-status actors often being
targets of envy (Fiske, 2011).
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As noted above, attacking a high-status actor may elicit retaliation and the AMC
framework would posit that fear of retaliation (if the attacker is lower-status) should
diminish the motivation to attack the high-status actor. However, most studies that have
documented high-status actors being attacked have not paid explicit attention to why the
lower-status actors were less concerned about retaliation in those cases. An assumption in
some studies, (e.g. Bendersky and Hays, 2012) has been that the high-status actors were
targeted because lower-status actors saw the obvious benefits and privileges of competing
with and beating higher-status actors.
Hypothesis 4b: A rival’s status relative to a focal firm is positively related to the focal
firm’s motivation to compete with that rival.
Relative Status of Rival and Market Commonality
The major goal of this section is to resolve the ambiguity inherent in hypotheses
4a and 4b. Although hypothesis 4a predicts that status hierarchies are likely to be selffulfilling and stable, hypothesis 4b and several anecdotal examples from the business
world point to high-status firms often coming under attack from lower-status ones. A
natural question in this context is under what circumstances each of hypothesis 4a and 4b
holds.
I answer this question by building theory which predicts that a rival’s status
relative to a focal firm interacts negatively with the rival’s market commonality with the
focal firm to predict the focal firm’s motivation to launch action against the rival. In
doing so, I help to resolve the ambiguous role of status in predicting motivation to launch
action by highlighting the role of market commonality as a contingency. Interestingly, my
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theory points to high-status firms being motivated to launch action against lower-status
ones too under certain circumstances.
Relative Status of Rival, Market Commonality and Motivation
The stimulus-response model within social cognition holds that once a stimulus
(in this case, the presence of a rival) has passed the perceptual filter, that is, once it has
been noticed by decision-makers within a firm, it is labeled and categorized, with the
label serving as an address to a cognitive category (Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Jackson
and Dutton, 1988; Mervis and Rosch, 1981; Rosch and Mervis, 1975). A long tradition of
research has established that two broad labels that strategic decision-makers use when
they categorize stimuli are “threat” and “opportunity”, with threats associated with loss
and negative situations with the decision-makers within the focal firm perceiving
themselves as having less control and opportunities associated with positive and gain
situations with decision-makers perceiving themselves as having more control (Dutton
and Jackson, 1987; Gregoire, Barr and Shepherd, 2010; Jackson and Dutton, 1988;).
Once a rival has passed the perceptual filter, that is, once a focal firm has become
aware of a rival, I posit that specific combinations of the rival’s status relative to the
focal firm and the rival’s market commonality with the focal firm lead decision makers to
evaluate the situation with respect to the rival as a threat or opportunity. All situations
that involve a focal firm and a rival can be assigned to one of the cells of the 2 X 2 grid
displayed below.
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Rival higher status than focal
High
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Low

IV

Rival lower status than focal
firm

III

Low
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I

II

Low market commonality

High market commonality

Label within cell is focal firm’s motivation to launch action against rival
Figure 2: The four zones
Once a focal firm is cognizant of a rival, there are four possibilities that
correspond to the four zones in the above figure:
Zone 1 – the rival is lower than the focal firm in status and has low market commonality
with the focal firm
Zone 2 – the rival is lower in status and has high market commonality
Zone 3 – the rival is higher in status and has high market commonality
Zone 4 – the rival is higher in status and has low market commonality
It is somewhat less likely that a rival would be in zone 1 in the first place as based on the
arguments leading to hypotheses 1 and 3 above, it is less likely that the focal firm would
be aware of a lower-status rival that has low market commonality with itself, given the
earlier arguments that both the relative status of a rival and the rival’s market
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commonality with the focal firm determine whether the focal firm is aware of the rival
(Anderson et al, 2001; Chen, 1996).
However, even if a focal firm does become aware of a rival that is lower than
itself in status and has little or no presence in its key markets, it is unlikely to proceed
with processing the stimulus and categorizing the situation with respect to the rival as
either of “opportunity” or “threat”. There is typically little incentive for higher-status
firms to attempt to compete with lower-status rivals given that doing so may hurt their
own status positions and exclusivity (Podolny, 1993; Washington and Zajac, 2005) and in
the absence of shared markets (Baum and Korn, 1996) there is little to gain. Hence a
focal firm is unlikely to classify launching action against a lower-status, low market
commonality rival as an opportunity. At the same time, a focal firm would not classify a
low-status low market commonality rival as a threat as it is unlikely to perceive any loss
about a lower-status rival that has little or no presence in its important markets. A rival in
this zone is thus likely to be classified as relatively inconsequential. The motivation to
launch action against such a rival is likely to be low.
These arguments are consistent with the AMC framework (Chen, 1996; Chen et
al, 2007). Although the high-status firm would perceive itself as capable of competing
with the low-status rival, motivation to launch action would be low given the possible
dilution in status and the absence of shared markets.
Zone 2 corresponds to a situation where a rival is lower in status but has high
market commonality with the focal firm. The key difference between zones 1 and 2 is
that in zone 2, the lower-status rival has made inroads into the focal firm’s important
markets. In this zone, there are clear gains to be had from beating a visible competitor.
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Although some work predicts that high-status firms would lose their exclusivity and
status positions if they competed with lower-status ones (Podolny, 1993; Washington and
Zajac, 2005), that argument is less likely to apply in this case because by entering the
markets of the focal firm, the rival has already established a market tie and association
with the higher-status focal firm so the focal firm has less to lose as an association
already exists. However, it has much to gain by launching action against the rival as the
rival has occupied its key markets. The focal firm is likely to be better equipped to
compete with the rival as its higher-status would endow it with clear advantages in the
event of a war, given extant status research that has pointed out that higher-status firms
and actors in general have better access to opportunities, resources and capabilities
(Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Merton, 1968; Podolny, 1993). In addition, the privileges
that accrue from possessing higher-status are likely to lead decision makers at the focal
firm to perceive themselves as being in control. Given that the situation is one with
potential gains and where the focal firm is in control, decision-makers at the firm are
likely to label and categorize the situation as an opportunity. Past research notes (Dutton
and Jackson, 1987) that situations labelled as opportunities are likely to lead in turn to
externally directed actions (such as competitive actions). Motivation to launch
competitive action should thus be high within this zone.
Although many studies have found that market commonality diminishes
motivation to launch action (Baum and Korn 1996, 1999; Gimeno and Woo, 1996), most
of them have been based on situations where competing firms have worked out “live-andlet-live” arrangements. The arguments on market commonality leading to forbearance are
often based on fear of retaliation (Chen, 1996). Fear of retaliation, however, is less
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applicable for a high-status focal firm facing a low-status rival. Applying the AMC
framework, the focal firm is likely to be motivated in this scenario and perceive itself as
capable of launching action against the lower-status rival, rendering it likely that the focal
firm will launch action against the rival.
Zone 3 corresponds to a situation where a rival is higher in status and has high
market commonality with a focal firm. This situation is one where a higher-status rival
has occupied a lower-status firm’s key markets. The focal firm is less likely to feel in
control as attempting to compete with the rival may elicit retaliation that may hurt the
focal firm in its key markets (Baum and Korn, 1996; Edwards, 1955). The focal firm has
much to fear if the rival retaliates given the that the rival’s higher-status makes it easier
for the rival to access opportunities, resources and capabilities in the event of a war
(Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Merton, 1968; Podolny, 1993) and that the rival has a
significant presence in its key markets (Baum and Korn, 1996; Chen, 1996). It is likelier
that the focal firm would perceive such a situation as a threat because it is a loss situation
where the focal firm is unlikely to perceive itself as being in control. Theory within social
cognition (Dutton and Jackson, 1987) holds that a firm is unlikely to launch an externally
directed (such as a competitive) move in a situation that is perceived as a threat.
Motivation to launch action against the rival would thus be low within this zone.
Once again, these arguments are consistent with the AMC framework. Unlike in
zone 2, the rival with high market commonality in zone 3 is higher than the focal firm in
status. The forbearance argument (Baum and Korn, 1996, 1999; Chen, 1996) is likely to
apply in this case (from the point-of-view of the focal firm) because the focal firm has
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much to fear if the rival retaliated. Motivation is thus subdued and the focal firm is
unlikely to perceive itself as capable vis-à-vis the rival.
Zone 4 is a situation where a rival is higher in status and has low market
commonality with the focal firm. There is a clear incentive for the lower-status firm to
attempt to enter the more attractive markets of the higher-status rival. Although, as noted
above, a higher-status rival would have advantages in competition, retaliation is less
likely to be a concern here given that the rival is not present in the focal firm’s key
markets (Baum and Korn, 1996; Edwards, 1955). Moreover, if the higher-status rival
retaliated against the lower-status focal firm by attempting to enter the focal firm’s
markets, observers are likely to perceive a dilution in the higher-status rival’s status
position (Benjamin and Podolny 1999; Podolny, 1993; Washington and Zajac, 2005). In
this situation, decision makers at the focal firm are likely to feel in relative control and
perceive potential gain. They are likely to classify the situation as an opportunity and to
take externally directed competitive actions. Motivation to launch action is likely to be
high within this zone. When applying the AMC framework, the focal firm would again be
clearly motivated in zone 4, for the reasons just described. Although it may perceive
lower capability to contest the rival, it is unlikely to be as concerned with retaliation in
zone 4 given the absence of shared markets.
While research within the area of multi-market contact (summarized in Yu and
Cannella, 2013) has often used the term mutual forbearance to refer to firms refraining
from attacking rivals that they meet in multiple markets, some scholars (e.g. Chen, 1996)
have pointed out the potential asymmetry when adopting the vantage point of the specific
firms within those situations. One firm within the competitive dyad may feel greater
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pressure to forbear than the other. The reasoning above is from the vantage points of
decision-makers within a focal firm and points to zones 2 and 4 as situations where a
focal firm is motivated to launch action and to zone 3 as one of forbearance (once again,
from the view point of individual firms). It may be that actions taken by the focal firm
when a certain rival is perceived to lie within zones 2 or 4 (and possible responses by the
rival) may eventually lead to mutual forbearance at the level of the dyad.
In summary, the key arguments above are that with increasing status of the rival
relative to the focal firm, decreasing market commonality leads to greater motivation to
launch action and that with increasing market commonality of the rival relative to the
focal firm, decreasing status of the rival relative to the focal firm leads to greater
motivation to launch action. This effect corresponds to a negative interaction between
relative status of the rival and rival’s market commonality with the focal firm when
predicting the motivation to launch action.
Hypothesis 5: The rival’s market commonality with the focal firm and the rival’s status
relative to the focal firm interact negatively to predict the focal firm’s motivation to
compete with the rival.
Relative Status of Rival, Market Commonality and Awareness
It is strongly established (Gregoire et al, 2010; Jackson and Dutton, 1988;
Schneider and De Meyer, 1991) that firms are likelier to notice and pay attention to
threats rather than opportunities. Jackson and Dutton (1988) labeled this phenomenon the
“threat bias.” The reasons for a threat bias are not fully understood but empirical studies
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have provided consistent support (e.g. Jackson and Dutton, 1988; Schneider and De
Meyer, 1991).
While the reasoning leading to hypothesis 5 above considers rivals that have
passed the perceptual filter of a focal firm, that is, that a focal firm has become aware of,
and notes how different combinations of a rival’s relative status and market commonality
are likely to lead to different levels of motivation to launch competitive action, a key
question is how much attention a firm would be paying to rivals in the different zones.
This question is partially answered by hypotheses 1 and 3, as they predict the main
effects of rival’s market commonality and relative status on awareness.
In addition, given that firms are likelier to notice and pay attention to threats,
rivals within zone 3 are likely to get more attention from decision makers within the firm
than rivals in the other zones. I note here that rivals in zone 3 are not only likely to
receive more attention because of the combined main effects of high-status and high
market commonality with the focal firm but that there is an interactive effect over and
above the direct effects when a rival is in zone 3 because of the tendency for decision
makers to pay more attention to threats than opportunities.
In summary, rivals in zone 1 are unlikely to get much attention, rivals in zone 2
and 4 are likely to receive some attention, while rivals in zone 3 are likely to receive the
lion’s share of the focal firm’s attention, not only because they have higher relative status
and high market commonality (combined main effects from hypotheses 1 and 3), but
because of the tendency to pay more attention to threats than opportunities. Put
differently, with increasing relative status of the rival, increasing market commonality is
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likelier to lead the focal firm to perceive the rival as a threat, and is likely to intensify the
attention the firm pays to the rival.
Hypothesis 6: A rival’s relative status and market commonality interact positively to
determine a focal firm’s awareness of the rival.
Interestingly, putting hypotheses 5 and 6 together, it stands to reason that most of
a focal firm’s competitive attention is focused on rivals that are of high-relative status and
have high market commonality with the focal firm, that is, those within zone 3, but that
the focal firm is simultaneously more likely to forbear from attacking those rivals. While
a focal firm is likely to invest much competitive attention on those rivals, it is unlikely to
act against them.
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METHOD
I conducted two empirical studies. The main study was a field study on gourmet
food trucks in the Lexington area within Kentucky and tested all hypotheses. In addition,
I conducted a supplementary study that consisted of an experiment through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk tool to further validate hypothesis 5, given its pivotal role. I describe
each of these in turn.
Main Study – Food Trucks in Lexington
My primary empirical setting was gourmet food trucks in the Lexington area
within Kentucky. Lexington has a thriving gourmet food truck scene with about thirty
active food trucks at any time. These food trucks serve a very wide variety that ranges
from Stoner Gourmet and Pizzas to Caribbean and Mexican foods. They tend to be at
microbreweries in the evenings, office locations at mid-day and at various events.
Appendix A lists the subset of 17 food trucks that responded to the survey, with
pseudonyms for the food trucks and types of food (to preserve confidentiality) and the
status score of each food truck, which is the average of all other food trucks’ ranking of
that food truck’s status.
While gourmet food trucks have been used in other studies (Sonenshein, Nault
and Obodaru, 2017), the reasons for choosing them in my dissertation were manifold.
Preliminary investigation suggested that food trucks in this area were characterized by the
presence of a clear status hierarchy. I also learned that they could not park anywhere
without permission and that the higher-status food trucks had easier access to the coveted
locations. For example, Ford (pseudonym) was run by former executive chefs and was
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generally considered one of the most prestigious food trucks in town. Owners of the
premier micro-breweries knew and respected Ford. Ford had excellent curb appeal and
served a unique gourmet menu. They often got permission to park at the premier microbreweries on weekend nights that attracted relatively price-inelastic customers. On the
other hand, Toyota (pseudonym) had far lower curb appeal, served a basic fare and had to
fight very hard for slots as the owner of Toyota did not have any of the connections to the
location managers or respect and admiration that Ford enjoyed.
Importantly, status is a social psychological and perceptual construct so a valid
measure of status as perceived by firms within a certain context should be based on
responses from the firms. It would have been very hard to get access to decision-makers
at large public listed companies and measures like performance and size are not valid
measures of status. The fact that I could survey and interview the food truck owners
facilitated the measurement of status in a valid manner. In addition, the fact that I could
keep track of the locations of food trucks facilitated measurement of market
commonality.
A major limitation of many past studies in competitive dynamics and multimarket contact (e.g. Baum and Korn, 1996; Chen et al, 1992; Yu et al, 2009) is that they
have inferred intent from observations of actual competitive actions and responses.
Seldom have these studies surveyed or interviewed decision-makers at firms (a notable
exception is Chen et al, 2007). For example, if firm A launched a competitive action at
time t1 and firm B launched a similar action at time t2, it may not be accurate to assume
that firm B responded to firm A as it is possible that both A and B were responding to
general changes in industry conditions. Although some studies (e.g. Chen and Hambrick,
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1995) used content analysis and labeled a move a response if it was alluded to as such in
the media, that approach relies on the accuracy of media attributions. Moreover, none of
these studies explicitly measured awareness or motivation. In constructing the empirical
design for my study, I thus sought to improve upon prior studies by measuring these
variables directly as opposed to inferring them from patterns of competitive action and
response. Access to food truck owners facilitated such measurement. I hope my study
will set a precedent for future competitive dynamics research.
Methodological Approach
Because the context of food trucks is relatively new in research on competition
and in strategy in general, with Sonenshein et al (2017) being the only other study that I
could identify, the methodology that I employed was the ethnographic sandwich (Ofem,
Floyd and Borgatti, 2013), with a traditional quantitative field study sandwiched between
two layers of semi-structured interviews. The purpose of the first layer of layer of semistructured interviews was to understand the context and tailor the measures and
methodology in the quantitative field study to be valid in the context of theory. The
purpose of the second layer of semi-structured interviews was to understand the results
from the field study from the perspective of respondents.
I incentivized food trucks to participate by offering to mention the name of their
food truck in the Gatton Wire, a newsletter produced by the Gatton College of Business
at the University of Kentucky if they participated and by offering to share interesting
results and competitive insights from the study with participating food trucks.
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Figure 3: Ethnographic Sandwich

First round of semi-structured interviews
I conducted semi-structured interviews with food trucks Renault, Nissan, Bugatti,
Toyota and Ford (pseudonyms) at the beginning of the study to understand the context
and design valid measures for the quantitative field study. Renault, Nissan, Bugatti and
Toyota also took the subsequent survey hence appear in Appendix 1. Ford did not take
the subsequent survey but received the highest status score for any truck. I took notes and
transcribed all interviews. All the five food truck owners confirmed the presence of a
status hierarchy among food trucks. They underscored the role of status in gaining access
to the coveted locations and often at coveted times, supporting the role of status as a
signal of quality (Podolny, 1993; 2001). For example, Lexington has a thriving microbrewery scene and Thursday, Friday and Saturday at the premier micro-breweries draw
relatively price inelastic consumers with deeper pockets making those slots especially
attractive in revenue opportunities. Higher-status food trucks tended to have easier access
to these slots. One of the food truck owners (Toyota) even explained that the higherstatus food trucks knew the owners of the most coveted locations and got preferential
access to them, especially at coveted times, which was confirmed in subsequent
interviews with other food truck owners as well.
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The food truck owners also confirmed that head-to-head competition in this
context was mostly for the coveted locations and sometimes at coveted times that ensured
better revenue opportunities. Of course, once a food truck got a certain location at a given
time, it was still important to attract as many consumers as possible but food truck
owners said they did not perceive themselves as competing with other food trucks at that
stage given that the different locations were usually not close to one another. Exceptions
were events where many food trucks congregated at the same place and time. In addition,
there were some consumers who followed a food truck that they liked.
Some of the food truck owners initially saw the word “competition” as referring
to something negative or a dislike for another food truck but when I explained to them
that I was referring to “healthy competition that motivates a food truck to perform to its
best” and not anything unhealthy like for example sabotaging another food truck, they all
agreed that it was present.
Food trucks indicated several key success factors. The key success factors that
converged across the five interviews were access to locations with better revenue
opportunities, curb appeal, uniqueness of menu, price, presence on social media, and
speed of service. Collectively, the interviews underscored the presence of a status
hierarchy as well as competition among food trucks, especially for coveted locations.
Quantitative Field Study
Data and measures
I assembled a list of all operating food trucks in Lexington through a website on
Lexington food trucks created by food truck enthusiasts, the official website of the
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Lexington Beer Scene (food trucks were often present at the micro-breweries), the
Facebook page of the Bluegrass Food Trucks Association, and a Facebook page created
by food truck enthusiasts devoted to Lexington food trucks. I could identify 29 active
food trucks. I phoned each food truck before embarking on the study asking what would
be the best way to keep track of their locations. I then kept track of their locations on
Twitter, Facebook, their own websites, the Lexington Beer Scene website and the
Facebook page for Lexington food trucks (based on which source/s a food truck said was
the best way to follow them) for 130 days over the summer and fall of 2016 (starting
second half of June and ending Oct 31st).
The 29 food trucks were at 169 distinct locations over the observation period. The
period over which I observed them was the peak business period (as business declines
slightly in the winter). I created a matrix where each row was a food truck and each
column corresponded to morning or evening of a given day. The entries in the cells were
the specific locations. Appendix 2 contains an extract of this matrix, with pseudonyms for
the food trucks and locations.
I sent the survey to the food trucks at the end of the period that I observed their
locations. The survey had questions on status, awareness, motivation, collaboration over
locations, type of food served, and price point. I piloted the survey on a set of six PhD
students in Management at the University of Kentucky before rolling it out. In addition, I
gathered the Facebook review ratings for all food trucks while they were taking the
survey. The unit of analysis was the food truck dyad. The 17 food trucks that responded
to the survey yielded 272 (17 times 16) food-truck dyads. The dependent variables,
independent variables, moderators and control variables were all represented as 17 X 17
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matrices. Diagonal elements were disregarded for analyses of course, as it makes little
sense to examine how aware a food truck is of itself or how motivated a food truck is to
attack itself.
Dependent Variables
Awareness. I measured awareness and motivation, the two dependent variables, through
survey questions. The question for awareness was “This section is designed to capture the
extent to which YOU are aware of, pay attention to, observe and follow the moves and
goings on of particular OTHER FOOD TRUCKS. So, for each truck on the list below,
please indicate whether they are firmly and consistently on your ‘radar screen’ versus
whether you ignore or couldn’t care less about them”. The question was followed by 0 –
100 sliders for every food truck other than the one taking the survey with labels of
“Ignore” at 0, “Watch closely” at 100 and “Keep tabs on” around 50. Cell (i, j) in the
awareness matrix was the extent to which food truck i watched food truck j.
Motivation. The question for motivation to launch action was only displayed for those
food trucks that the focal food truck indicated being aware of (greater than 0 on the 0 –
100 slider) as some awareness is a pre-requisite for motivation (Chen, 1996; Dutton and
Jackson, 1987). The question was “This section is designed to capture the extent to which
YOU feel the motivation, the urge or some pressure to compete more aggressively
against particular other food trucks. More specifically, towards which of the other food
trucks listed below do you feel motivated to make and carry out strategic and operational
decisions that you believe will improve your food truck’s status, reputation, quality and
general effectiveness? Please note that the only food trucks that appear below are those
that you indicated being aware of.” The question was followed by 0 – 100 sliders for
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every food truck that the focal food truck indicated being aware of with labels of
“Unmotivated” at 0, “Somewhat motivated” around 50 and “Highly motivated” around
100. Cell (i, j) in the motivation matrix was the extent to which food truck i was
motivated to carry out competitive action against food truck j.
Independent and Moderating Variables
Relative status of rival. When measuring status through the survey, there was the
possibility that a food truck’s motivation to launch action against other food trucks would
influence responses on the status question or that some third factor would influence
responses to both the status and motivation questions. To circumvent this problem, I
created a status score for each food truck which was the average of all food trucks’
ratings of its status. I measured rival’s status relative to the focal firm as the rival’s status
score minus the focal firm’s status score. This approach helped me account for potential
endogeneity and is valid based on evidence that there is usually strong consensus about
an actor’s position with a status hierarchy (Anderson et al, 2006; Magee and Galinsky,
2008) as status is inter-subjectively agreed upon (Washington and Zajac, 2005; Weber,
1978). Supporting my approach and past research on consensus about actors’ positions
within status hierarchies was strong agreement among food trucks, with a Cronbach’s
Alpha of 0.833. The actual question was “Our preliminary interviews with some food
truck owners suggest that food trucks in the Lexington area occupy different levels of
status (a pecking order) in terms of being respected and admired, and having social
standing. For each food truck in the list below (including your own), please click on the
status level box that best represents how YOU perceive their level of status”. The
question was followed by a list of all food trucks and a five-point scale from status
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ranging from very low (1) to very high (5). Cell (i, j) in the “relative status of rival”
matrix was the average of all food trucks’ ratings of j’s status minus the average of all
food trucks’ ratings of i’s status.
Similarity in status. I operationalized similarity in status, the key independent variable in
hypothesis 4a as the absolute value of the differences in the status scores of a focal firm
and a rival. This measure is of course a reversed score of similarity.
Rival’s market commonality with focal firm. As outlined in the theory sections, I defined
market commonality as “the degree of presence that a competitor manifests in the
markets where it overlaps with a focal firm” (Chen, 1996). Broadly, market commonality
has been operationalized in three different ways in prior literature (Yu et al, 2009).
Market level measures capture the degree of multi-market contact among firms serving a
market (Jans and Rosenbaum, 1996). Firm-in-market measures capture the degree of
multi-market contact between a focal firm and its focal market competitors (e.g. Baum
and Korn, 1996). Dyad-level measures reflect the overall degree of multi-market contact
between two firms in all markets in which they are present (e.g. Baum and Korn, 1999;
Chen, 1996). Given the dyadic level of analysis in my study, the last type of
operationalization was the natural one. Dyadic measures of market commonality have in
turn been operationalized in two different ways. While some earlier measures (e.g.
Gimeno and Woo, 1996) were based on counts of the number of markets in which two
firms competed, more recent research (e.g. Yu and Cannella, 2007) recognizes that it is
critical to account for the strategic significance of each market to the focal firm,
rendering as appropriate fine-grained measures that account for both a rival’s presence in
a focal firm’s markets and the importance of those markets to the focal firm (e.g. Chen,
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1996; Yu and Cannella, 2007). For example, Baum and Korn (1999, p. 261) noted that “It
is not sufficient that the absolute number of market contacts is high; it is necessary that
firms perceive the contact as an important part of their competitive environment”.
Against this backdrop, I used a measure adapted from Chen (1996). In my dissertation,
market commonality that food truck B has with food truck A (direction is important
because it is an asymmetric measure) is based on two factors – (1) the relative importance
of different markets to A and (2) the extent of B’s presence in each of those markets. The
general formula that I used for market commonality is adapted from Chen (1996). I
defined food truck B’s market commonality with food truck A as:
𝑛
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where n = number of markets served by A over observation period
𝑝𝑎𝑖 = number of days that A is at market i
𝑝𝑎 = number of days that A is at any market
𝑝𝑏𝑖 = number of days that B is at market i
𝑝𝑖 = number of days that any food truck is at market i
A key question in this context is the definition of a market. It seems that the
notion of a market from the vantage point of a firm is to some extent a cognitive
construct (Baum and Korn, 1999). To ensure robustness, I ran three sets of models with
different assumptions of what constitutes a market. In one set of models, I considered
each location to be a market. Semi-structured interviews indicated that at the breweries,
the Thursday, Friday and Saturday evening slots were more coveted than others so I ran
another set of models that distinguished this set at breweries from other evenings. Finally,
I ran models that treated a location-day of week pair (e.g. Mondays at UK Healthcare) as
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a market. I refer to these three measures as market commonality1, market commonality2,
and market commonality3 respectively.
I considered all 29 food trucks when determining market commonality using the
above formula. That resulted in a 29 X 29 matrix. I then extracted the 17 X 17 market
commonality matrix corresponding to the food trucks that responded to the survey.
Importantly, I did not drop the location data for the other 12 food trucks (that did not
respond) when computing market commonality as that would have resulted in distorted
measures.
I noted that there were very few locations (mostly certain events) that had food
trucks in both the morning and the evening rendering it redundant to distinguish these
two (mornings and evenings) as markets. The office locations tended to have food trucks
for lunch and the microbreweries tended to have food trucks in the evenings. Cell (i, j) in
the market commonality matrix was food truck j’s market commonality with food truck i.
It is important to note that market commonality as just defined is asymmetric. A rival’s
market commonality with a focal food truck is not necessarily the same as the focal food
truck’s market commonality with the rival.
Control Variables
In building the set of control variables, I was motivated by two major
considerations. I sought to include variables that (1) helped me account for alternative
explanations and (2) that predicted the outcomes (awareness and motivation) so that I
could generate more precise estimates of the impact of rival’s relative status, market
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commonality and their interactions, given that they would only have to account for
residual variance (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
In keeping with the above spirit, dyad-level competitive dynamics research has
generally controlled for dyad-level variables that help to account for alternative
explanations or are related with dependent variable. For example, Chen et al (2007)
controlled for objective structural tension when predicting perceived competitive tension
to rule out the alternative explanation that objective structural tension was driving the
results. Specifically, in my study, it was important to control for performance differences.
Studies that have predicted the effects of status (or status differences) on an outcome
have usually controlled for performance (or performance differences) to isolate the effect
of status (or status differences) and rule out the alternative explanation that performance
(or performance differences) was driving the effects (e.g. Washington and Zajac, 2005).
Past research has also found that a firm’s position within the collaboration
network circumscribes competitive action opportunities available to the firm (Gnyawali
and Madhavan, 2001; Gnyawali, He and Madhavan, 2006), which necessitated that I
account for a food truck’s position in a network of collaboration. Over and above these
two variables, I included other variables that I considered important in this specific
context. I describe each control variable that I used and the rationale for including that
control variable below.
Differences in Facebook ratings. Status differences may be correlated with visible
measures of performance so there was the possibility that the real reason for the
awareness of and motivation to launch action against another food truck was differences
in performance as opposed to in status. Unlike public-listed firms, none of the food trucks
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in my sample, all of which were privately owned, had publicly visible measures of
revenues or profits, making it unlikely that they were driving the results. However, food
trucks’ Facebook review ratings did represent a publicly visible measure of performance.
To account for this alternative explanation, I controlled for differences in Facebook
ratings. Cell (i, j) in the Facebook matrix was the natural log of (because the distribution
of Facebook review ratings was skewed) food truck i’s Facebook review rating minus the
natural log of food truck j’s Facebook review rating.
Collaboration. Given that the food trucks may have helped one another access locations,
there was the possibility that a focal food truck felt less motivated to launch action
against a rival in zone 3 of figure 1 because of fear of losing support in accessing
locations. To account for this alternative explanation, I included whether the focal food
truck received such help from the rival as a control variable. I asked all food trucks in the
survey which other food trucks they phoned if they knew of an opportunity at a location
that they couldn’t take. I coded cell (i, j) in the collaboration matrix to one if food truck j
indicated providing help to food truck i as just described and to zero otherwise. I
followed this approach rather than asking the focal food truck whether they received help
to rule out potential endogeneity.
Differences in price points. There was the possibility that any effect of the relative status
of the rival was in fact because of differences in price points. Past research notes that
high-status firms can charge a premium for their products and services given the
signaling value of status and that products and services from a high-status firm are more
coveted (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1993). To account for this alternative
explanation, I ascertained price differences from a survey question asking the food truck
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approximately how much they charged for a meal excluding beverages. I then included as
a control the matrix of price differences in which cell (i, j) was what i charged for a meal
minus what j charged.
In addition, I included two control variables with the intent of generating more
precise estimates of my independent variables and moderators, given that I saw the
possibility that these two variables may impact awareness and motivation. Controlling for
these two variables left my independent variables and moderators with having to explain
residual variance, lowering the standard errors of the regression estimates.
Similarity in type of food. I controlled for whether the focal food truck and rival served
the same type of food. I asked them what type of food they served in the survey. Cell (i, j)
in the food type matrix was coded to one if food trucks i and j served the same type of
food and to zero otherwise. Past research (Zuckerman, 1999) has underscored the general
psychological importance of the categories to which firms belong, necessitating a control
for whether food trucks served the same type of food.
Awareness. I controlled for awareness in all models with motivation as the dependent
variable. Given that I only displayed the motivation question for those food trucks that a
focal firm indicated being aware of (greater than zero on a 0-100 scale), including
awareness as a control left my independent variables and moderators with having to only
explain residual variance thus generating more precise estimates.
Analyses and results
All analyses are at the dyadic level, from the point of view of a focal firm viewing
a specific rival. I tested hypotheses 1, 3 and 6 first. They all share the same dependent
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variable – the focal firm’s awareness of the rival. I ran three sets of models with the three
different measures of market commonality. I then tested hypotheses 2, 4a, 4b, and 5 that
share the same dependent variable – the focal firm’s motivation to launch action against
the rival. Again, I ran three sets of models with the three different measures of market
commonality.
Given that the unit of analysis was the food truck dyad, I could not use OLS as
dyadic data violate the assumption of independence of observations. To overcome this
challenge, I used the Quadratic Assignment Procedure (Krackhardt, 1988). QAP does
away with the assumption of independence of observations and is especially well-suited
to accounting for the autocorrelation in dyadic data (Krackhardt, 1988). It has been often
used with dyadic data in strategic management research (Chen et al, 2007; Tsai, Su and
Chen, 2011). I log transformed Awareness and Motivation because they were skewed.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations. I used QAP correlations in
determining significance levels.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations - main study

* - p < 0.05 per QAP correlations; 5,000 permutations
Tables 2 through 4 present tests of hypotheses that predict awareness and use
market commonality 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Market commonality 1 treats each location
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as a market. Market commonality 2 distinguishes Thursday, Friday and Saturday
evenings from others at the breweries. Market commonality 3 treats each location-day-ofweek pair as a market (e.g. Mondays at UK Healthcare and Fridays at Blue Stallion
Brewing).
Table 2: QAP models predicting log of awareness – mkt commonality 1
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Similar type of food

0.051

0.099

0.121

0.122

Differences in FB rating

-0.150

-0.198

0.153

0.179

Price differences

-0.050

-0.043

-0.025

-0.022

Collaboration

0.105

0.089

0.271*

0.280**

3.293*

2.388*

2.045*

0.465**

0.394**

Market commonality1
Rival’s relative status
Relative status X Market commonality1
Adjusted R-square

3.261*
0.024

0.042

0.246

0.257

**p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10. Two-tailed tests for all variables. 2,000 permutations.
Table 3: QAP models predicting log of awareness - mkt commonality 2
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Similar type of food

0.051

0.104

0.124

0.124

Differences in FB rating

-0.150

-0.201

0.149

0.176

Price differences

-0.050

-0.043

-0.024

-0.022

Collaboration

0.105

0.088

0.269*

0.278**

3.571*

2.594*

2.202*

0.464**

0.395**

Market commonality2
Rival’s relative status
Relative status X Market commonality2
Adjusted R-square

3.197*
0.024

0.045

0.247

0.258

**p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10. Two-tailed tests for all variables. 2,000 permutations.
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Table 4: QAP models predicting log of awareness – mkt commonality 3
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Similar type of food

0.051

0.077

0.102

0.099

Differences in FB rating

-0.150

-0.192

0.164

0.203

Price differences

-0.050

-0.045

-0.026

-0.024

Collaboration

0.105

0.105

0.283**

0.287**

3.508+

2.112

1.424

0.468**

0.423**

Market commonality3
Rival’s relative status
Relative status X Market commonality3
Adjusted R-square

3.138+
0.024

0.034

0.239

0.242

**p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10. Two-tailed tests for all variables. 2,000 permutations.
Model 1 in table 2 consists of just the control variables. Model 2 tests hypothesis
1. Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive relationship between a rival’s market commonality
with a focal food truck and the focal food truck’s awareness of the rival. This hypothesis
is supported, with an unstandardized co-efficient of 3.293 for market commonality (p <
0.05). However, despite the co-efficient being positive and the hypothesis receiving
support, I note that the adjusted R-square of the model is just 0.042 suggesting low
explanatory power for all control variables and market commonality combined.
Model 3 in table 2 tests hypothesis 3, which predicted a positive relationship
between a rival’s relative status and a focal food truck’s awareness of the rival. This
hypothesis receives very strong support. The unstandardized co-efficient for rival’s
relative status is 0.465 (p < 0.01). Perhaps noteworthy is that the adjusted R-square
jumps to 0.246. The difference in adjusted R-square between models 2 and 3 indicates
that, at least, in this context, a rival’s relative status is a much stronger predictor of
awareness than market commonality. I explored this phenomenon further in the semistructured interviews that followed the quantitative analyses.
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Model 4 in table 2 tests hypothesis 6, which predicted a positive interaction
between rival’s relative status and market commonality on a focal firm’s awareness of the
rival. Hypothesis 6 is supported, and the adjusted R-square jumps to 0.257. The unstandardized co-efficient for the interaction term is 3.261 (p < 0.05). Figure 4 depicts the
interaction plot.

Figure 4: Interaction of relative status of rival and market commonality predicting
awareness
Table 3 attempts to replicate the results with market commonality 2 and table 4
with market commonality 3 and all hypotheses generally continue to be supported. With
market commonality 3 (which treats each location-day-of-week pair as a market),
hypothesis 6, which predicted an interaction between rival’s relative status and market
commonality on awareness, is only marginally supported. The un-standardized coefficient for the interaction is 3.138 (p < 0.10). I note, however, that the overall results
are largely robust to different specifications of market commonality.
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Tables 5 through 7 present tests of hypotheses that predict motivation and use
market commonality 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
Table 5: QAP models predicting log of motivation – mkt commonality 1

Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Log of awareness

0.368**

0.373**

0.374**

0.362**

0.372**

Similar type of food

0.345*

0.333*

0.335*

0.335*

0.334*

Differences in FB rating

0.051

0.063

0.062

0.078

0.064

Price differences

0.031*

0.030*

0.030*

0.030*

0.029*

Collaboration

-0.076

-0.072

-0.075

-0.063

-0.069

-0.780

-0.737

-0.790

-0.645

0.023

0.053

Market commonality1
Absolute value of difference in status

-0.053

Relative status of rival
Relative status X Market
commonality1
Adjusted R-square

-1.59*

0.305

0.305

0.304

0.303

0.308

**p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10. Two-tailed tests for all variables. 2,000 permutations.
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Table 6: QAP models predicting log of motivation – mkt commonality 2
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Log of awareness

0.368**

0.373**

0.374**

0.362**

0.371**

Similar type of food

0.345*

0.334*

0.336*

0.336*

0.335*

Differences in FB rating

0.051

0.062

0.061

0.077

0.062

Price differences

0.031*

0.030*

0.030*

0.031*

0.030*

Collaboration

-0.076

-0.073

-0.075

-0.063

-0.070

-0.718

-0.667

-0.729

-0.548

0.023

0.051

Market commonality2
Absolute value of difference in status

-0.053

Relative status of rival
Relative status X Market
commonality2
Adjusted R-square

-1.512+

0.305

0.305

0.304

0.303

0.306

**p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10. Two-tailed tests for all variables. 2,000 permutations.
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Table 7: QAP models predicting log of motivation – mkt commonality 3
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Log of awareness

0.368**

0.376**

0.377**

0.364**

0.371**

Similar type of food

0.345*

0.329*

0.330*

0.331*

0.332**

Differences in FB rating

0.051

0.077

0.077

0.095

0.058

Price differences

0.031*

0.029*

0.029*

0.029*

0.027*

Collaboration

-0.076

-0.076

-0.078

-0.065

-0.071

-2.120*

-2.094*

-2.156*

-1.542+

0.027

0.064

Market commonality3
Absolute value of difference in status

-0.053

Relative status of rival
Relative status X Market
commonality3
Adjusted R-square

-2.872*

0.305

0.313

0.312

0.311

0.319

**p < 0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.10. Two-tailed tests for all variables. 2,000 permutations.

Model 1 in table 5 consists of only the control variables. Food trucks seem to have
greater motivation to launch action with other food trucks that serve similar types of
food. The un-standardized co-efficient for serving a similar type of food is 0.345 (p <
0.05). Interestingly, food trucks seem to be more motivated to compete with other food
trucks that serve food at lower price points. With price differences defined as the focal
food truck’s typical price for a meal minus the rival’s typical price for a meal, the unstandardized co-efficient for price differences is 0.031 (p < 0.05). I explored this
phenomenon further in the semi-structured interviews that followed the quantitative
analysis. The adjusted R-square for the model with control variables is 0.305, suggesting
strong explanatory power.
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Model 2 in table 5 tests hypothesis 2, which predicted that a rival’s market
commonality with a focal food truck has a negative relationship with the focal food
truck’s motivation to launch action against the rival. Hypothesis 2 does not receive
support. Although the direction is as envisaged, with an unstandardized co-efficient of 0.780, the effect is not statistically significant even at a p < 0.10. The adjusted R-square
is 0.305, the same as for the controls-only model.
Hypothesis 4a predicted that the absolute value of differences in status between a
focal firm and rival would be negatively related to the focal firm’s motivation to launch
action against the rival. Model 3 in table 5 tests hypothesis 4a. While the direction of the
co-efficient for the absolute value of difference in status is as predicted (unstandardized
co-efficient of -0.053), the hypothesis is not supported even at p < 0.10. The adjusted Rsquare stays approximately the same at 0.304.
Hypothesis 4b predicted that the status of a rival relative to a focal firm would
bear a positive association with a focal firm’s motivation to launch action against the
rival. Model 4 in table 5 tests this hypothesis, which again does not receive support even
at a p < 0.10 although the co-efficient is along the predicted direction. The
unstandardized co-efficient for the relative status of a rival is 0.023, in the anticipated
direction but not significant. The adjusted R-square is 0.303.
Model 5 in table 5 tests hypothesis 5, which receives support (p < 0.05). While
the main effects of rival’s relative status and market commonality do not receive support,
the interaction of rival’s relative status and market commonality is in the direction
envisaged and significant at p < 0.05, perhaps suggestive of the importance of
considering the two variables in tandem with each other. There is a small rise in the
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adjusted R-square to 0.308. The unstandardized co-efficient for the interaction term is 1.59. Figure 5 depicts the interaction plot.

Figure 5: Interaction of relative status of rival and market commonality predicting
motivation
Tables 6 and 7 attempt to replicate the results with the other measures of market
commonality. The results are largely consistent with hypothesis 5 receiving some support
(p < 0.10) with market commonality 2, which distinguishes the Thursday, Friday and
Saturday evening slots from the others at the breweries, and full support (p < 0.05) with
market commonality 3, which considers each location-day-of-week pair as a market.
Interestingly, model 2 in table 7 indicates that the main effect of market
commonality on motivation to launch action is negative and significant when market
commonality is defined in terms of a location-day of week pair. The unstandardized coefficient is -2.120 (p < 0.05) so hypothesis 2 does receive support in this model.
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Assessing the findings and alternative explanations
Both market commonality and the relative status of a rival predict awareness of
rivals, with rival’s relative status appearing to matter substantially more than market
commonality. While the main effects of rival’s relative status and market commonality
on motivation are not significant (with the exception of the model that operationalizes
market commonality considering both location and day-of-week), the interaction is
significant and in the predicted direction, pointing to the importance of considering
market commonality when attempting to predict how a rival’s relative status influences
motivation to launch action and to the importance of considering rival’s relative status
when attempting to predict how market commonality influences motivation to launch
action. In addition, the fact that hypothesis 6 is supported lends credence to the theorizing
leading to hypothesis 5 – that firms are likely to perceive high-status rivals that have a
significant presence in their markets as a threat.
A strength of the findings is that they help to rule out alternative explanations.
While status in general is often correlated with several measures of success, as for
example, revenue and profitability, the fact that such data is not publicly available for
food trucks helps to rule out the possibility that the effect is not because of status but
differences among those dimensions. While Facebook review ratings are publicly
available, I explicitly control for them in the analyses (and in fact differences in FB
ratings are not strongly correlated with differences in status). The fact that the effect for
the interaction term remains significant when controlling for possible collaboration helps
to rule out the possibility that forbearance is because of fear of losing such support. In
addition, the fact that the results are generally supported under different measures of
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market commonality serves as an important robustness check. While the greater
motivation to launch action against food trucks that serve similar types of food was
expected, it is interesting that food trucks are more motivated to compete with rivals at
lower price points, a phenomenon that I explored further in the semi-structured
interviews that followed the quantitative analyses.
Second round of semi-structured interviews
I conducted a second round of semi-structured interviews with five food truck
owners – Toyota, Chrysler, Ferrari, Porsche and Mercedes (pseudonyms). All five had
responded to the survey. In referring to food trucks in my description of the semistructured interviews, I use pseudonyms in appendices 1 and 2 to preserve confidentiality.
The reasons for conducting these interviews were manifold. First, given that I had singleitem scales for measures like awareness and motivation, I wanted to confirm that
respondents approached the questions as I envisioned. Second, I was interested in
understanding exactly how they approached concepts like status, awareness and
motivation. Third, I sought to confirm that the reason I was seeing the results was
because of the specific theoretical mechanisms I envisioned. Fourth, I sought to further
probe the interesting finding of food trucks being more motivated to launch action against
rivals that served food at lower price-points. Finally, I anticipated that the interviews
would lead to new and interesting questions for future research. I took notes and
transcribed all interviews.
While my script was tailored to survey responses from the specific food trucks
that I interviewed, I had questions asking how they approached the status, awareness and
motivation questions, and sought to understand the reasons for their responses.
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Transcripts for all relevant questions and answers are in appendices 3 through 7 (I also
engaged in informal conversation with each of the food truck owners that I interviewed
but have excluded informal conversation from the transcripts presented in the
appendices). Below I organize and describe key takeaways from the interviews.
I was interested in understanding how they approached the question on status.
Interestingly, it turns out that food trucks perceive quality among themselves very
differently from laypeople. One of them said “If the [other] food truck also runs a
restaurant, I make it a point to visit the restroom at that restaurant. With my experience,
how clean the rest room is says a lot about their quality.” Another pointed to the quality
of food and whether he knew and liked the owner. One said he rated as high in status
those food trucks that “I would eat from. I respect their quality and food and [in some
cases] they happen to be my friends.” Other answers were “based on FB ratings and
observing how popular the food truck is” and “quality as I see it.” Despite these views
appearing divergent, it turns out that food trucks were in remarkable agreement on ratings
of the statuses of other food trucks, with a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.833.
Past research has emphasized that status hierarchies are inter-subjectively agreed
upon and stable (Magee and Galinsky; Washington and Zajac, 2005; Weber, 1978) and
indeed that view received support in my study. However, individuals may hold slightly
different views of the hierarchy, as suggested by the comments from food truck owners
above. A key question in this context is what the consequences are for decision-makers
within firms when their perceptions of the hierarchy differ from the consensus. If the
consequences turn out to be important, it may also be interesting to probe the antecedents
to holding views of the status hierarchy that are divergent from the consensus,
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ascertaining specifically whether these slightly varying views are idiosyncratic or there
are systematic biases based on characteristics of the firm or decision-maker. Future
research should delve deeper into this phenomenon.
I was also interested in understanding whether awareness was calculated and the
outcome of a competitive logic or not and how important different factors were in
predicting awareness. It seemed that in this context, there was the presence of both
conscious and sub-conscious drivers of awareness. One food truck owner said, “there
needs to be something that stands out in another food truck for me to take notice…either
they look very good or the food is really great or there’s something else that would make
me notice them.” Another said “I watch Ford [Ford was generally highly rated on status
by most food trucks] because they set the trend…they are popular…I watch where they
are and what they do. I watch Suzuki and Porsche [food trucks that served food that was
similar in type to the one owned by the interviewee] to make sure I am doing different
things from those. I believe that developing a niche is better than cut-throat competition.”
The owner of one food truck (he and a close friend jointly ran the food truck) said (as
expected they had generally indicated being aware of higher-status food trucks), “we
observe Jeep and Kia because their business models are similar…they are similar to us so
we observe their menus and prices…we observe Mercedes because it is such a good
looking food truck and has long queues…we notice when there are long queues and a
food truck is popular.” The importance of rival’s relative status over market commonality
in predicting awareness was underscored by one food truck owner who, when asked why
she didn’t indicate being aware of another food truck that was often at the locations she
was at (although not at the same time), replied “They are sub-standard!”
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Past research has highlighted that several heuristics determine which stimuli pass
the perceptual filters of decision-makers including status (Anderson et al, 2001; and
Kovacs and Sharkey, 2014), market commonality (Chen, 1996), and aspiration-level
triggers (Cyert and March, 1963). At the same time, past research has indicated that
certain heuristics are also learned from experience (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011).
Finally, it is plausible that organizational decision-makers also use calculated logics to
determine what signals in the environment to pay attention to. Interviews with the food
truck owners revealed the presence of all three. It would be both interesting and
important to investigate the relative effectiveness of these different mechanisms for firms,
and their consequences for decision-making and performance.
Interestingly, when probing how price-points affected motivation to launch
action, some food truck owners indicated that they felt that the food trucks charging
lower prices were inferior in quality and trying to undercut the higher quality food trucks
on price, providing some explanation for the results that suggested greater motivation to
beat rivals at lower price-points. At the same time [a contradiction], they said that food
trucks chalk out different territories as far as locations and consumers are concerned and
that “someone who goes there at an event where we are all there would not be thinking of
coming to my food truck…” One food truck owner, who was not among the higherstatus ones in average ranking, however, suggested the opposite. He said he felt his fare
was just as good as those of Ford [which was ranked very high on status] but that they
charged more because they were higher in status.
Scholars have highlighted that possessing high-status allows firms to charge a
price premium, both because of the signaling value of status when market participants are
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confronted with uncertainty and because status may be something valued (Podolny, 1993;
Sorenson, 2014). However, the privilege of being able to charge higher prices is
accompanied by an interesting downside. High-status producers are often compelled to
charge higher prices and cannot lower prices as doing so and associating with lowerstatus producers may result in a dilution of exclusivity and high-status (Podolny, 1993;
Washington and Zajac, 2005). It stands to reason then, that status may also be a trap
under some circumstances as high-status producers may be deprived of some of the
opportunities that lower-status producers have access to.
About motivation to launch action, there was a clear boost in motivation that they
perceived from beating a higher-status rival. Specifically, about the highest ranked food
truck in status, one owner said, “I feel I can give them a run for their money” and another
referred to them as “gold-standard” (the same word was used by another owner too about
the highest ranked food truck) and referred to beating them as “aiming for the top.” Food
truck owners also confirmed the importance of food type. One said, “I am motivated to
beat Renault [which served a similar type of food] because I feel I can do better than
them.” They said even among trucks serving the same type of food, not all are
competitors, e.g. “we see Jeep and Kia as competitors because they have similar business
models” pointing to the presence of cognitive categories (Porac and Thomas, 1990; Reger
and Huff, 1993). Interestingly, about forbearance based on market contact, when showed
several food trucks that had high market commonality with one another, one food truck
owner remarked “Oh…yeah…they are all in the same group and know each other.”
Despite these comments, the main effects of rival’s relative status and market
commonality were not significant in the quantitative analyses.
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The boost in motivation from beating a higher-status rival was consistent with
other studies (e.g. Kilduff et al, 2010). A key difference between an empirical context
like NCAA basketball (as used in Kilduff et al, 2010) and this study is that, with NCAA
basketball, teams of different statuses are often scheduled to play against each other. In
the context of firms, however, decision-makers have much greater agency and choice and
can decide whether they even want to enter a contest against a firm at a different level
within the status hierarchy. Among the key contributions of this dissertation is that it
suggests exactly when the boost in motivation from beating a higher-status rival would
translate into actual competitive action against a high-status firm.
I tried to elicit food truck owners’ reactions to some rivals in the different zones
in Figure 2. Rivals in zone 4 (high-status, low market commonality) elicited reactions
like “I feel I can give them a run for their money” while rivals in zone 3 (high-status,
high market commonality) elicited reactions like “I know them. They are my friends and
I respect them.” Rivals in zone 2 (low-status, high market commonality), some of which
were new food trucks that had made inroads into the markets of the higher-status food
trucks, elicited negative reactions from the older and higher-status food trucks, some of
whom seemed skeptical.
In sum, the second round of semi-structured interviews served to validate the
findings. Respondents seemed to approach the awareness and motivation questions as I
originally envisioned. The theoretical mechanism too received some validation. Finally,
as noted above, the interviews opened the possibility of several new avenues for future
research to probe more deeply.
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A key benefit from the ethnographic sandwich was the two layers of semistructured interviews. While the first layer helped design a valid quantitative field study,
important given that this is a relatively new empirical context in strategy and
management research, the second layer helped with internal validity by eliciting
respondents’ comments on the results from the field study. Importantly, the second layer
of semi-structured interviews also helped probe related questions and elicit explanations
for several interesting results, laying a foundation for future research. The combination of
quantitative analyses and qualitative interviews collectively helped enhance rigor.
Consequences and supplementary analyses
The theorizing and results above lead to important and interesting consequences
for firms in real-world situations that is best illustrated with an example from the real
world. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Detroit automakers were considered higher-status than
the Japanese ones. My theory would predict that Ford focused most of its attention on
General Motors (which was a high-status rival that had a major presence in the American
markets that were important to Ford – in zone 3 of Figure 2) while refraining from
launching a major offensive against GM (i.e., high awareness but low intent to launch
competitive action, characteristic of zone 3). My theory would also predict that Ford
focused probably little to no attention on Toyota as Toyota would have been in zone 1
with respect to Ford (low-status, low market commonality). Interestingly, for Toyota,
Ford was a higher-status rival with low market commonality, i.e., zone 4 of Figure 2
(Toyota did not have as much of a presence in US markets then unlike today). Based on
the theory above, Toyota’s competitive focus must have been on GM and Ford, while
Ford’s focus was probably on GM (high awareness, low motivation). It is perhaps not
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surprising that Toyota launched several major competitive moves to penetrate the US
market and win market share over GM and Ford, which it did. Consistent with past
research in competitive dynamics that has emphasized the importance of competitive
action against a rival on market share gain (Chen and Miller, 2012; Smith et al 2001),
Toyota won market share over GM and Ford. My theory would predict that Ford and GM
woke up and began paying attention to Toyota after it penetrated their key markets, i.e.
by which time Toyota moved from zone 1 to zone 2 in the eyes of Ford and GM. A key
theoretical underpinning is the asymmetry in awareness and motivation, which I
investigate further below. Three key takeaways from the consequences of my theory and
results are that (1) higher-status firms are likelier to come under attack from rivals with
whom they do not compete much in markets (2) they are unlikely to be aware of or
motivated to attack those rivals and (3) they are likely to become aware of and motivated
to attack those rivals after the rivals have penetrated key markets. My theory and results
thus point to higher-status firms having more to fear from lower-status firms with which
they do not compete in markets as opposed to from lower-status firms on whose turf they
are significant players. The lower-status firms that are outside of the higher-status firms’
key markets simply feel less pressure to forbear from competitive attack.
As a side observation, Toyota’s status too changed over time and today it is
perhaps often perceived as higher-status than Ford and GM. However, based on past
research on status (Magee and Galinsky, 2008; Merton, 1968), it is perhaps reasonable to
assume that status changes, even when they do occur, unfold over much longer time
frames than changes in market commonality, given the inertia within status hierarchies. It
is perhaps reasonable to assume that when Ford and GM woke up and began paying
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attention to and became motivated to beat Toyota (which was perhaps towards the end of
the 1970s), Toyota was still in zone 2 (low-status, high market commonality). Summing
up, it is plausible that the different zones in Figure 2 represent temporally distinct phases
of competitive engagement at the level of the firm-rival dyad.
I conducted further analyses exploring the asymmetry in awareness and
motivation. Specifically, I ran analyses with UCINET VI (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman,
2002) that measured dyad-level reciprocity. Dyad-level reciprocity is the proportion of
ties that are reciprocated. A very interesting finding was that, while dyad-level reciprocity
was low in the Awareness matrix (approximately 0.08), it was zero in the Motivation
matrix, implying that in not even one instance where food truck A indicated being
motivated to compete with food truck B, did food truck B indicate being motivated to
compete with food truck A.
Supplementary Study – Experiment through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk Tool
I designed an experiment to test the theoretical mechanism leading to Hypothesis
5, given its pivotal role. Central to the theory leading to hypothesis 5 was the argument
that specific combinations of a rival’s relative status and market commonality with a
focal firm would lead the focal firm to perceive the situation with respect to that rival as
an opportunity or threat (Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Jackson and Dutton, 1988) and that
that in turn would predict motivation to launch action. I sought to conduct an experiment
to validate this theoretical mechanism.
Although hypothesis 5 was supported in the field study, I sought to more
thoroughly test the role of the perception of specific situations as opportunities or threats
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as mediating the relationship between specific combinations of market commonality and
rival’s relative status and motivation to launch action. I sought to achieve this objective
by recruiting subjects and rolling out an experiment that presented them with vignettes
corresponding to the four zones in Figure 2 and eliciting their views on how they
perceived the situations they were presented with.
Many past competitive dynamics studies have theorized certain antecedents as
impacting the propensity for action or response (e.g. Chen et al, 1992; Chen et al, 2007).
However, when testing theory, these studies have fallen short of verifying the mechanism
leading up to the results. For example, Chen et al (2007) theorized that a rival’s relative
scale was likely to lead to greater perceived competitive tension through its impact on the
focal firm’s awareness of the rival. However, the mediating mechanism was not
explicitly tested. In my dissertation, I sought to improve upon past research by explicitly
testing causal mechanisms and hence ran an experiment through Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk tool.
In my theorizing, I held that specific combinations of market commonality and
relative status would lead a focal firm to perceive the situation with respect to a rival as
an opportunity or threat. I sought to explicitly test this mechanism on subjects presented
with vignettes that varied market commonality and status of a hypothetical rival. My
objective was to validate that the specific combinations of market commonality and
rival’s relative status in Figure 2 would lead to the perception of a given situation with
respect to a rival as an opportunity (threat) and that that in turn would lead to a greater
(lower) propensity to launch competitive action against a rival. Parallel to the logic of
hypothesis 5, I expected to find a negative interaction between a rival’s relative status and
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the rival’s market commonality when predicting motivation to launch action. However,
rather than treat the perception of the situation as an opportunity of threat (Dutton and
Jackson, 1987; Jackson and Dutton, 1988) as black box, I sought to explicitly measure it
and test its role as a mediator. Specifically, I sought to validate the mediated moderation
model (Muller, Judd and Yzerbyt, 2005) depicted below.

Rival’s relative status X
market commonality

-

Perception as
opportunity (threat)

+

Likelihood of
competitive action

Figure 6: Mediated moderation
In the experiment, each subject was presented with a vignette asking him/her to
imagine him/herself as a Bourbon maker in Kentucky. I then asked the subject to picture
a rival Bourbon maker. The two variables that I manipulated were the status of the rival
and the rival’s presence in markets supposed to be important to the subject resulting in
four possible scenarios. In addition, I set up each scenario to reflect benefits and costs as
expected from previous research in status and competitive dynamics. I then asked an
attention check question. That was followed by questions on the extent to which they
perceived the situation to be positive, the extent to which they felt in control and how
likely they would launch a competitive move in that situation. In addition, I provided
subjects with an open-ended text box asking them to indicate why they picked the options
that they did and gathered demographic characteristics.
Subject recruitment and rollout
I recruited 120 subjects through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk tool. Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk is a crowdsourcing tool that allows researchers to distribute surveys to
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large numbers of workers, who are paid to complete the survey, over the Internet
(Chandler and Shapiro, 2016). It allows for quick subject recruitment and rollout. Much
past research on status in the context of firms has relied upon archival data (e.g.
Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Chung et al, 2000; Podolny, 1993). While these studies
have laid out several theoretical mechanisms linking status to important organizational
outcomes, what has been missing is a clear validation of those mechanisms. Some recent
research in status (e.g. Hahl and Zuckerman, 2014) has attempted to move along this
direction by using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to test underlying psychological
mechanisms that result from either possessing or observing someone else who possesses
status.
Subjects were promised payment of 75 cents upon completion of a task that
would present them with a business scenario and asked how they would respond to that
scenario. The title of the task was “If you were a Bourbon maker in Kentucky…” To
ensure uniformity and given that people outside the US may not know what “Bourbon”
and “Kentucky” mean, I restricted subjects to those who had voted in the 2016 US
Presidential election. I assigned the vignettes corresponding to the four possible
combinations of rival’s status and market commonality at random. I used the
randomization tool in Qualtrics, which helped me design the survey, and selected
“Evenly present elements” in Qualtrics’ randomization setup so that I would get
approximately 30 responses to each of the four scenarios.
Design Description
I first had a set of questions in which I asked subjects their age, gender as they
perceived it, race and occupational status. I then presented them with a vignette asking
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them to imagine themselves as a Bourbon maker in Kentucky and asking them to picture
a rival Bourbon maker. I manipulated the rival’s status and market commonality and
presented subjects with the benefits and costs of attack based upon prior research in status
and competitive dynamics. Below are the actual vignettes I used in the four different
scenarios. Status and market commonality refer to that of the rival.
High-status, low market commonality:
Picture yourself as a Bourbon maker in the beautiful Bluegrass region of Kentucky. Elite
Bourbon is another Bourbon maker in the Bluegrass. Elite Bourbon is, however,
considered to be a higher-status Bourbon maker than you, meaning that Elite Bourbon's
products are generally perceived to be of higher quality than yours. Your markets don't
overlap much. Elite Bourbon sells Bourbon through upmarket stores all over the world
while you sell your Bourbon through regular stores that attract middle-class consumers.
You are wondering whether you should make a competitive move to enter Elite Bourbon's
markets. A competitive move in this context refers to an action like a new product
introduction, a change in price or an advertising campaign. As far as retaliation goes,
Elite Bourbon may retaliate against you in its markets. However, it is unlikely to retaliate
by attempting to enter the middle-class markets that account for most of your revenues as
it would mean a dilution of its brand image.
High-status, high market commonality:
Picture yourself as a Bourbon maker in the beautiful Bluegrass region of Kentucky. Elite
Bourbon is another Bourbon maker in the Bluegrass. Elite Bourbon is, however,
considered to be a higher-status Bourbon maker than you, meaning that Elite Bourbon's
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products are generally perceived to be of higher quality than yours. However, Elite
Bourbon does have a significant presence in your markets. Although Elite Bourbon's
primary channels are upmarket stores, their products often also appear in the same
middle-class stores that stock your products and sometimes your consumers also
purchase Elite Bourbon's products. You are wondering whether you should make a
competitive move to gain market share with respect to Elite Bourbon. A competitive move
in this context refers to an action like a new product introduction, a change in price or an
advertising campaign. However, Elite Bourbon may retaliate and because Elite Bourbon
is higher-status than you and has a significant presence in your markets, retaliatory
competitive moves from Elite Bourbon may hurt your business.
Low-status, low market commonality:
Picture yourself as a Bourbon maker in the beautiful Bluegrass region of Kentucky.
Masses Bourbon is another Bourbon maker in the Bluegrass. Masses Bourbon is,
however, considered to be a lower-status Bourbon maker than you, meaning that Masses
Bourbon's products are generally perceived to be of lower quality than yours. Your
markets don't overlap much. Masses Bourbon sells Bourbon through stores that attract
middle-class consumers while you sell your Bourbon through upmarket stores all over
the world. You are wondering whether you should make a competitive move to enter
Masses Bourbon's markets. A competitive move in this context refers to an action like a
new product introduction, a change in price or an advertising campaign. Your upmarket
consumers may perceive a dilution in your quality if you are seen competing with or
attempting to enter Masses Bourbon's markets. As far as retaliation from Masses
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Bourbon is concerned, though, you have an advantage in the event of a war given your
higher-status.
Low-status, high market commonality:
Picture yourself as a Bourbon maker in the beautiful Bluegrass region of Kentucky.
Masses Bourbon is another Bourbon maker in the Bluegrass. Masses Bourbon is,
however, considered to be a lower-status Bourbon maker than you, meaning that Masses
Bourbon's products are generally perceived to be of lower quality than yours. However,
Masses Bourbon does have a significant presence in your markets. Although Masses
Bourbon's primary channels are middle-class stores, their products often also appear in
the upmarket stores that stock your products and sometimes your consumers also
purchase Masses Bourbon's products. You are wondering whether you should make a
competitive move to gain market share with respect to Masses Bourbon. A competitive
move in this context refers to an action like a new product introduction, a change in price
or an advertising campaign. Although Masses Bourbon may retaliate, your higher-status
endows you with an advantage in the event of a war.
Following the vignette, I had an attention check question asking whether the
rival’s status was lower or higher than the subject’s. That was followed by three
questions. I asked “To what extent to you perceive potential gains (or losses) by
launching the competitive move against Masses Bourbon?” That was followed by a
seven-point scale with labels – “bad losses,” “significant losses,” “some losses,” “neither
gains nor losses,” “some gains,” “significant gains,” and “great gains.” I then asked “To
what extent do you anticipate being in control if you went ahead with launching the
competitive move against Masses Bourbon?” That was followed by a five-point scale
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with labels – “really not in control, not in control, not really in control, somewhat in
control, fully in control.” That in turn was followed by the question “How likely is it that
you will go ahead and launch the competitive move against Masses Bourbon?” and a
seven-point scale with labels – “extremely unlikely,” “moderately unlikely,” “slightly
unlikely,” “neither likely nor unlikely,” “slightly likely,” “moderately likely,” and
“extremely likely.” Finally, I had an open-ended multi-line text box “Please give us your
comments on why you selected the options you did.”
Data and Measures
I measured the dependent variable, which was the likelihood of launching
competitive action, based on the option selected, with extremely unlikely coded as 1 and
extremely likely coded as 7. To measure the extent to which the subject perceived the
situation as one involving gains (losses), I converted the response to a number by coding
“bad losses” as 1 an “great gains” as 7 with the options between the extremes
progressively coded as 2 through 5. To measure the extent to which the subject perceived
being in control, I converted the response on the question to a number with “really not in
control” coded as 1 and “fully in control” coded as 5. To measure the mediator, which
was the extent to which the subject perceived the situation as an opportunity or a threat, I
summed the standard scores of the responses to the questions on the extent to which they
perceived the situation as one involving gains (losses) and the extent to which they felt in
control. I created this basic measure to represent the extent to which they perceived a
situation as an opportunity (potential gains and in control) or threat (potential losses and
not in control), consistent with the theory in social cognition that I articulated earlier
(Dutton and Jackson, 1987). Finally, in the vignettes in which the rival was higher in
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status, I coded the rival’s status as 1 and in the ones where the rival was lower in status, I
coded the rival’s status as -1. In the vignettes in which the rival had high market
commonality, I coded market commonality as 1 and in the ones where the rival had low
market commonality, I coded market commonality as -1.
Analyses and Results
I dropped two cases that failed the attention check. The final sample consisted of
119 cases. Thirty-one cases corresponded to a high-status low market commonality rival,
31 to high-status high market commonality, 29 to low-status low market commonality
and 28 to low-status high market commonality. Of course, all models needed controls for
main effects and demographic variables (given the between-subjects design). I controlled
for age and gender and included dummy variables for race and occupational status. I use
ordinary least squares regression and robust standard errors in all models. Table 8
presents descriptive statistics and correlations.
Table 8: Descriptive statistics and correlations – supplementary study

Tables 9 and 10 present results for the test of mediated moderation. A test of
mediated moderation consists of three steps (Muller, Judd and Yzerbyt, 2005)– (1)
establishing that the interaction predicts the outcome, (2) establishing that the interaction
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predicts the mediator, and (3) establishing that the interaction loses significance in a
model with both the interaction and the mediator. Hence, I was interested in (1) whether
the interaction of rival’s relative status and market commonality predicted the likelihood
of launching action, (2) whether the interaction of rival’s relative status and market
commonality predicted the extent to which the individual perceived the situation as an
opportunity (threat), and (3) whether the interaction of relative status and market
commonality lost significance when placed alongside the extent to which the individual
perceived the situation as an opportunity (threat) in a model that predicted the likelihood
that the individual would launch action.
Tables 9 and 10 helped me perform the above tests. The outcome for all models in
table 9 is likelihood of action while the outcome for the models in table 10 is the
perception of opportunity (threat).
Table 9: OLS models predicting likelihood of action
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Table 10: OLS models predicting perception of opportunity (threat)

All three tests for mediated moderation mentioned above were validated. The first
test was whether the interaction of rival’s relative status and market commonality
predicted likelihood of action. I tested this in model 4 of table 9. The unstandardized coefficient for the interaction of relative status of rival and market commonality is -0.488
and significant (p < 0.01) so the interaction does predict the outcome.
The second test was whether the interaction of relative status and market
commonality predicted the extent to which the individual saw the situation as an
opportunity (threat). I tested this in model 4 of table 10. The co-efficient for the
interaction of relative status of rival and market commonality is -0.109 and statistically
significant (p < 0.05) so the interaction predicts the mediator.
Finally, model 5 of table 9 has both the mediator and the interaction term in a
model that predicts the outcome, that is, the interaction of relative status and market
commonality and the perception of the situation as an opportunity (threat) in a model
predicting likelihood of action. The interaction term is no longer statistically significant
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(at p < 0.05) when the mediator is present in the model. The three tests when taken
together support mediated moderation.
Figures 7 and 8 are bar plots depicting how the perception of the situation as an
opportunity or threat varies depending on the specific combination of relative status of
rival and rival’s market commonality with the focal firm. I note that the low-status rival
low market commonality combination seems to elicit perceptions of the situation as more
of an opportunity than a threat. However, a key distinction between the experiment and
the field study is that the experiment does not account for awareness. Based on the
theorizing and results from the field study it is unlikely that a firm would be paying
significant attention to a rival in this zone. As already noted, even if a focal firm is aware
of a rival in this zone, it is unlikely to be watching it closely or even to proceed with
classifying the stimulus as a threat or opportunity. The experiment forces a response
along those dimensions for all subjects. This may also be the reason that the direct effect
of status in perceiving a situation as an opportunity or threat is negative and significant.
Despite that, the mediated moderation model receives support. The bar plots for
likelihood of action are along expected lines. There is no bar corresponding to the “Low
status low market commonality” scenario as the likelihood of action is on average very
close to zero in this case.
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Figure 7: Bar plots for perception of opportunity (threat)
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Figure 8: Bar plots for likelihood of action
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DISCUSSION
Given the conflicting predictions on how a rival’s relative status influences
motivation to launch action, I set out to resolve the conflict by examining the role of
structural properties of engagement in markets as a moderator. Two key predictions that
emerged from my theoretical model were that the interaction between a rival’s market
commonality with a focal firm and the rival’s status relative to the focal firm would bear
a negative relationship with the focal firm’s motivation to launch action against the rival
and that the interaction between a rival’s market commonality with a focal firm and the
rival’s status relative to the focal firm would bear a positive relationship with the focal
firm’s awareness of the rival. I set out to test predictions in the empirical context of food
trucks in Lexington. Both hypotheses received support in the field study.
In addition, key to my theorizing was that specific combinations of a rival’s
market commonality and relative status would lead a focal firm to categorize the situation
with respect to the rival as a threat or an opportunity and that that in turn would
determine whether the focal firm would launch action against the rival or not. I tested this
underlying psychological mechanism using an experiment through Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk tool. Results from the experiment supported the proposed mechanism.
Interestingly, the predicted main effects of a rival’s relative status were along
anticipated directions in the field study but not significant. However, the theory
predicting that motivation to launch action and awareness of rivals are influenced by the
negative and positive interactions of relative status and market commonality respectively
received support. Results from the field study perhaps suggest the importance of a rival’s
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market commonality in predicting when a focal firm would launch action against a rival
at the same or different position in the status hierarchy.
In the field study, the inclusion of control variables like differences in price points
and Facebook review ratings and collaboration helped to rule out alternative
explanations. In addition, the fact that food trucks do not vary greatly in size and that
their profits are not publicly available helps to rule out that the effects are because of
status differences being correlated with differences in revenues and profits.
Additional noteworthy observations from the field study are the very large impact
of relative status of a rival on awareness and the asymmetry in the matrices of awareness
and motivation. Side observations are that the motivation to compete is greater within
food categories and that food trucks display more motivation to compete with rivals that
sell their fare at lower price points.
Three important consequences of the theorizing and results are that (1) high-status
firms are likely to come under attack from rivals with whom they do not compete in
markets, (2) they are unlikely to be aware of or motivated to launch action against those
rivals when first attacked, and that (3) they are likely to become aware of and motivated
to launch action against those rivals after the rivals have occupied key markets. Below, I
review and discuss the findings in greater detail.
Findings: Study 1
Market Commonality and Awareness
Hypothesis 1 predicted an upward sloping relationship between a rival’s market
commonality with a focal firm and the focal firm’s awareness of a rival. This hypothesis
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was supported. This prediction is consistent with past strategy research (e.g. Chen, 1996;
Reger and Palmer, 1996) that has theorized or found that repeated engagement in markets
increases awareness. More broadly, management research (e.g. Kilduff et al, 2010) has
noted that repeated engagement makes a rival salient to a focal entity, whether at the level
of the individual, group or firm so the finding is along expected lines and not particularly
surprising.
Market Commonality and Motivation
Hypothesis 2 predicted that a rival’s market commonality with a focal firm would
be negatively related to the focal firm’s motivation to launch action against the rival. In
past research, market commonality has generally been found to have a dampening effect
on rivalry (Baum and Korn, 1996, 1999; Gimeno and Woo, 1996; Yu et al, 2009). This
hypothesis was supported in only one of my three operationalizations of market
commonality (which defined a market in terms of a location-day-of-week pair).
Past research has generally tested this hypothesis on large firms that have had
long histories of competition. It is plausible that forbearance emerged among those firms
after periods of substantial head-to-head competition (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990).
Yu and Cannella (2013) note this and make a call for research on out-of-equilibrium
situations. An interesting and important difference between my sample and those of other
studies (Baum and Korn, 199, 1999; Gimeno and Woo, 1996; Yu et al, 2009) is that there
is much churn among food trucks in Lexington, with new food trucks entering the market
and some older food trucks winding up to launch restaurants and catering businesses. It is
likely that my sample consisted of both equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium dyads, which
may have been the reason for the hypothesis not receiving overwhelming support.
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The advantage, with my sample, however, is that I could study those out-ofequilibrium situations systematically. Specifically, I could theorize and test that, in the
condition of high market commonality, a rival’s relative status would determine whether
a focal firm would forbear from launching action against the rival or not. My empirical
setting thus helped me answer the call by Yu and Cannella (2013).
Relative Status of Rival and Awareness
Hypothesis 3 predicted an upward sloping relationship between the relative status
of a rival and the focal firm’s awareness of a rival. This prediction was based on past
research that has found that higher-status actors garner more attention from other actors
and that status is a heuristic in search (Anderson et al, 2001; Graffin et al, 2013; Kovacs
and Sharkey, 2014). This hypothesis was very strongly supported. An interesting result
was that the relative status of a rival seemed to be a much stronger predictor of a focal
food truck’s awareness of the rival than the rival’s market commonality with the focal
food truck.
Relative Status of Rival and Motivation
As noted when developing theory, research currently makes equivocal predictions
on this relationship with one stream predicting that status hierarchies are relatively
uncontested, stable and self-fulfilling (summarized in Magee and Galinsky, 2008) and
another stream explicitly acknowledging and studying conflict within status hierarchies
(Bendersky and Hays, 2012; Gould, 2003; He and Huang, 2011). I thus developed two
conflicting hypotheses and tested both. The first hypothesis predicted that the status
similarity between a focal firm and rival would be positively related to motivation to
launch action (argument corresponding to the first stream). The second hypothesis
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predicted an upward sloping relationship between the relative status of a rival with
respect to a focal firm and the focal firm’s motivation to launch action against the rival
(argument corresponding to the second stream). Neither of these hypotheses received
support perhaps highlighting the importance of unearthing contingencies when
attempting to understand the role of status in the motivation to act against a rival.
Motivation and the Interaction of Relative Status and Market Commonality

Hypothesis 5 drew from theory within social cognition (Dutton and Jackson,
1987; Jackson and Dutton, 1988) to predict that the interaction of the rival’s relative
status and market commonality would have a negative relationship with a focal firm’s
motivation to launch action against a rival. Specifically, I highlighted that the motivation
to launch action against a rival would be greatest when (1) the rival was higher in status
and had low market commonality with the focal firm and (2) the rival was lower in status
and had high market commonality with the focal firm. This hypothesis was supported.
This hypothesis is central to my theorizing and receives support.
Awareness and the Interaction of Relative Status and Market Commonality
I theorized a positive relationship between the interaction of the relative status of
a rival and the rival’s market commonality with the focal firm’s awareness of the rival.
This hypothesis was supported. In reconciling this hypothesis with the previous one, an
interesting corollary is that the lion’s share of firms’ competitive attention is directed
towards higher-status rivals that have a significant presence in the firm’s markets but that
the firm is likely to forbear from launching action against these rivals. Another interesting
corollary is that, a low-status rival that has no presence in a focal firm’s markets is
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unlikely to be on the focal firm’s radar but the focal firm is likely to be prominent on the
rival’s radar. This asymmetry may have interesting consequences for the evolution of
inter-firm competition.
Findings: Study 2
Key to the theory leading to hypothesis 5 was that decision-makers within firms
associate different combinations of a rival’s relative status and market commonality with
the notions of “opportunity” and “threat” and that that in turn leads them to be motivated
to launch competitive action in some circumstances. Specifically, I theorized that
decision-makers perceive launching action against rivals of higher-status that have low
market commonality and rivals of lower-status that have high market commonality as
“opportunities” and that they are likely to launch action in those cases. On the other hand,
I theorized that they would consider higher-status rivals with high market commonality as
“threats” and forbear from launching action.
I sought to validate this theoretical mechanism by testing a mediated moderation
model through an experiment. The model I tested was one of the perception of a situation
as an opportunity or threat mediating a negative interaction between a rival’s relative
status and market commonality and the likelihood of launching action. Results from the
experiment supported the theory.
Contributions
The study makes contributions to the literatures in competitive dynamics, multimarket contact, status and entrepreneurial action. Competitive dynamics scholars have
long recognized that purposeful competitive action against rivals is key to market share
gain (Chen and Miller, 2012; Smith et al 2001) and they have been keenly interested in
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the antecedents to competitive action. However, the cognitive and psychological drivers
of competitive action have begun to get attention only relatively recently. For example,
Livengood and Reger noted (2010) that “competitive dynamics theory is well-developed
in understanding economic incentives; we know less about the role that non-economic
factors play in understanding competitive dynamics.” My dissertation informs this stream
by unlocking the role of status as a cognitive antecedent to competitive action.
More specifically, from an AMC perspective (Chen, 1996; Chen et al, 2007), it
seems that a rival’s relative status exerts opposing effects on the motivation and
capability components. Firms should be more motivated to compete with higher-status
rivals but fear of retaliation should exert a dampening effect on that motivation. The
natural puzzle is why the low-status firms that do wage wars against high-status ones do
so. I answered this puzzle by theorizing and testing the contingent role of market
commonality. A low-status firm has much to fear from a rival that it meets in markets but
less to fear from one that is outside of its key markets.
The idea of forbearance (Baum and Korn, 1996; Edwards, 1955; Yu and
Cannella, 2013) has been a key underpinning in research on multi-market contact (multimarket contact). Scholars have recognized that contact across multiple markets may lead
firms to exercise restraint in competitive behavior owing to the fear of retaliation across
markets (Baum and Korn, 1996, 1999; Chen, 1996; Gimeno and Woo, 1996). While the
term “mutual forbearance” has been used in much prior research, some scholars have
recognized that forbearance may be asymmetric (e.g. Chen, 1996).
Although there is broad support for the idea that contact across multiple markets
attenuates rivalry, there is keen interest in understanding contingencies that moderate the
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forbearance hypothesis and in a “more refined understanding” (Yu and Cannella, 2013, p.
100). My dissertation contributes to this stream by highlighting the role of the relative
status of a rival as such a contingency. In addition, I answer a call in a recent review of
the multi-market contact literature, (Yu and Cannella, 2013, p. 101; p. 102) for research
that relaxes the assumption of full observability, i.e., the assumption that defections from
equilibrium can be perfectly detected and punished.”
My dissertation contributes to the literature in status as well. Given that certain
streams of past research, such as negotiated order theory (Strauss et al, 1973), have put
forward the argument that status positions are negotiated on a continuous basis and many
scholars (e.g. Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1993; Podolny, 2001; Washington
and Zajac, 2005) have suggested that significant benefits accrue to higher-status actors, it
is natural that status hierarchies would spark off conflict. However, there is a large stream
of research (summarized in Magee and Galinsky, 2008) that documents that several
forces including expectancy and behavioral confirmation and hierarchy enhancing belief
systems lead to inertia within status hierarchies. A natural and key question in this
context is under what conditions status hierarchies become contested as opposed to taken
for granted. While some scholars (Gould, 2003; He and Huang, 2011) have attempted to
answer this question by advancing the notion that ambiguity with status hierarchies
breeds conflict, that still does not explain why even very clear status hierarchies are
contested sometimes. My dissertation helps to answer this question in the context of
status hierarchies among firms by theorizing and testing that structural properties of
firms’ engagement in markets may provide an explanation.
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My dissertation also contributes to the literature in entrepreneurial action. A basic
premise within theories of entrepreneurial action is that “Entrepreneurship requires
action” (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006, 132). Like competitive dynamics, this stream of
research is consistent with Austrian Economics (Kirzner, 1973; Schumpeter, 1934) in
recognizing the role of purposeful action by entrepreneurs. However, the primary focus
within this stream is on exactly how prospective entrepreneurs go about acting
(McMullen and Shepherd, 2006).
Scholars within the area (e.g. Shane, 2000; Shaver and Scott, 1992) have
recognized that opportunity recognition represents the beginning of the process of
entrepreneurial action. For example, Shane notes (2000, p. 448) that
“before…entrepreneurial exploitation, entrepreneurs must discover
opportunities…because opportunities do not appear in pre-packaged form, the process of
opportunity identification is far from trivial.” Given the pivotal role of opportunity
identification in the process of entrepreneurship, several studies have attempted to
investigate antecedents. Despite considerable progress in the area scholars maintain that
the field is at a nascent stage. Gregoire et al note (2010, 413) that “a great deal remains to
be learned about opportunity recognition.” Past research in this area (e.g. Shaver and
Scott, 1992) has noted the importance of considering how entrepreneurs construct
representations of the external environment and the importance of context in opportunity
identification. My dissertation helps to shed new light on this area, specifically by noting
the socio-cognitive process that leads decision makers to classify specific combinations
of a rival’s relative status and market commonality as opportunities or threats (Dutton
and Jackson, 1987; Jackson and Dutton, 1988).
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Finally, my dissertation sets a precedent on the empirical front. As noted earlier,
key constructs like awareness and motivation have never been explicitly operationalized
in prior literature within competitive dynamics, although they have been an important
part of theorizing. For instance, while Chen et al (2007) theorize that a rival’s relative
scale increases a focal firm’s awareness of the rival, they do not measure awareness.
Explicit measures of these important variables can enhance validity even when the
outcome of interest is actual competitive action or response. For example, in studies that
measure propensity for competitive action as an outcome, explicitly capturing these
variables and testing their roles as mediators can help to rule out alternative explanations.
Limitations
The sample I used for the field study was restricted to a set of food trucks in one
city within the United States. Future research should attempt replications on larger
samples from different industries, geographies and product markets. It seems that
particularly appropriate samples on which to replicate the findings would be those drawn
from high-velocity industries (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin,
2000). The study of “out-of-equilibrium” situations within multi-market contact research
necessitates the selection of such industries as they are simply likelier to contain such
situations. An alternative would be industries that have substantial churn, with firms
entering and exiting on a continuous basis, as this study did.
In addition, while I measured motivation to launch action, I did not distinguish
among different types of competitive actions. Past research in competitive dynamics (e.g.
Chen et al, 1992) notes, for example, that strategic and tactical actions have different
antecedents. Future research should investigate whether the relative status of a rival and

117

market commonality have different impacts on actions of different types. It would be
interesting to study whether the four different zones in Figure 2 differ in how they
influence strategic and tactical actions.
One of the overwhelming conclusions from past competitive dynamics research is
that competitive actions and responses have markedly different antecedents (Chen, 1996;
Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Yu et al, 2009). In many situations where firms may
mutually forbear from launching action, for example, they are likely to react quickly and
aggressively if either party defected (Chen, 1996; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Yu et
al, 2009). While my dissertation focuses on the motivation to launch competitive action, I
did not consider how firms differ about responding to actions from rivals in the different
zones of Figure 2. The consideration of competitive response along with the dynamics of
competition, as described above, would allow scholars to develop a rich and
comprehensive understanding of the evolution of competition, status and markets.
Finally, I measured awareness and motivation through single-item scales. While
the second round of semi-structured interviews helped to validate responses, future
research should develop and validate multi-item scales for these constructs. A key
limiting factor in using such scales is the cognitive load on respondents when they need
to answer multiple questions, each question about several entities. Nevertheless, the
development and validation of scales would help in laboratory experiments as well as
field studies where it is possible to obtain greater amounts of time from respondents.
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Directions for future research
Three directions seem especially promising for future research. First, it is quite
possible that the different zones in Figure 2 represent temporally distinct phases of
competitive engagement at the dyadic level. As I noted when discussing the
consequences of the theory and results, a high-status firm may perceive a low-status rival
that is outside of its key markets as being in zone 1 while the low-status rival may
perceive the high-status focal firm as being in zone 4. Launching action against the focal
firm would usually move the rival from zone 1 to zone 2 from the vantage point of the
focal firm. Once that happens, the focal firm is likelier to be motivated to attack the rival
and it is possible that the ensuing battle and the changes in market commonality that
result may lead to further shifts in the focal firm’s perception of the zone that the rival
belongs to and vice-versa. It is also possible that mutual forbearance may result from
both attaining high-status and having high market commonality with each other
(although, as I pointed out earlier, extant literature points to status usually taking long to
change even when it does). Future research should delve into the dynamics of such
engagement in the context of status and markets. It seems that such a question may be
best investigated through a combination of simulation (Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham,
2007) and empirical methods.
Second, the asymmetry in awareness and motivation is noteworthy. Although
popular media may allude to two firms as arch rivals e.g. Apple and Samsung, it is quite
possible that one of them may be significantly more motivated to compete with the other
than vice-versa. A particularly intriguing finding was that there was no reciprocity at all
in the matrix of motivation among food trucks. While competitive dynamics scholars
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have recognized the lack of symmetry in competitive relationships (Chen, 1996), the
consequences of such asymmetry for the evolution of competition and industries merits
further attention.
Finally, an interesting finding was that, when compared to market commonality,
the relative status of a rival played a far greater role in determining a focal food truck’s
attention to the rival than did the rival’s market commonality with the focal food truck.
While this dissertation is primarily concerned with how a rival’s relative status and
market commonality act in conjunction to determine a focal firm’s awareness of and
motivation to launch action, future research should delve deeper into the relative
importance of different antecedents to awareness and motivation and investigate the
psychological processes behind one antecedent having a substantially greater role than
the other. While understanding the relative importance of different antecedents would
improve the predictive power of research, a deeper understanding of the processes
involved would put that research on robust theoretical footing.
Summary
Given the ambiguous understanding of how the relative status of a rival impacts a
focal firm’s motivation to launch action, I set out to study the role of structural properties
of market engagement as a contingency. I theorized that market commonality, or the
extent to which a rival is a significant player in markets important to a focal firm, is a key
contingency in the relationship between a rival’s relative status and a focal firm’s
motivation to launch action against the rival. The key theoretical contribution is that
rival’s relative status and market commonality interact negatively to predict the focal
firm’s motivation to launch action against the rival and interact positively to predict the
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focal firm’s awareness of the rival. The theory received support in a field study on
gourmet food trucks in Lexington and in an experiment through Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk tool. My dissertation contributes to the literatures in status, competitive dynamics,
multi-market contact and entrepreneurial action.
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APPENDIX 1
Food truck
(pseudonym)

Food type
(pseudonym)

Status score

Chevrolet

Rabbit

3.44

Buick

Bear

3.73

Ferrari
Mercedes

Lion
Tiger

3.77
3.00

Volkswagen

Dog

2.63

Toyota

Cat

3.08

Honda
Subaru

Horse
Bison

3.45
4.19

BMW
Jaguar

Dog
Dog

3.09
2.60

Cadillac
Saab
Nissan

Deer
Antelope
Zebra

2.92
2.91
2.92

Kia

Dog

3.56

Hyundai

Rhino

3.80

Renault

Dog

3.80

Bugatti

Hippo

2.42
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APPENDIX 2
Food truck
pseudonym
Kia
Subaru
Saab
Ferrari
Tesla
Ford
Mercedes
Dodge

Jun 26th
Morning

Pontiac

Mexico

Jun 27th
Morning

Jun 27th
Evening

Jun 28th
Morning

Jun 28th
Evening

Jun 29th
Morning

Jun 29th
Evening

Norway

Sweden

Brazil

Brazil

Sweden

Sweden

Japan
USA
UK
Canada

Renault
Land Rover
Honda
Buick
Jaguar
Nissan
Jeep

Korea

Canada

China
Uruguay
Argentina

Argentina

Argentina

France
USA
UK

Chevrolet
Volvo
Lincoln
Suzuki
Hyundai
Holden
Porsche
Lamborghini
Rover
Tata
Cadillac
Bugatti
Chrysler

Jun 26th
Evening

Luxembourg

Turkey

France
Spain
UK
Germany

Germany

Italy

Luxembourg

Thailand

Argentina

Luxembourg
Russia

France
USA
UK

Sweden

Luxembourg
Sweden

India
Hungary
China

Nigeria

Uruguay
Singapore

Australia
Hungary

Ghana

Hungary
Romania
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APPENDIX 3
Interview with Toyota:
Q. How did you approach the status question? Why did you rank Ford as very high on
status? Why did you rank Tesla and Pontiac as high status (Tesla and Pontiac had
generally been ranked relatively low on status by the others.
A. I approached this question based on my perceptions of quality of food. Given my
extensive experience, I have a different way of judging quality than regular people. If the
food truck has a restaurant I make it a point to visit the restroom. How the restroom looks
says a lot about restaurant (or food truck run by the same owners). The food trucks that I
ranked high are those that I would eat from or take my family to.
Q. You indicated that you don’t watch Bugatti at all. We were surprised, as they seem to
have a strong presence at the locations you are at (although they may not be there at the
same time as you). Why are you so aware of Hyundai and Chevrolet? They serve different
kinds of food than you and Chevrolet doesn’t seem to be at the locations you are often at.
Why do you watch Jaguar so closely? In general, what factors determine the extent to
which you watch other food trucks?
A. In general, there must be something that stands out in a food truck for me to notice. I
notice when the food is very good or when the food truck looks really good. I watch
Hyundai and Chevrolet because they have good food and are good-looking food trucks.
The reason I watch Jaguar is because they serve …(a type of food) and I want to
incorporate that in my fare.
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Q. You don’t seem to be watching Ford very closely but seem very motivated to beat
them. Why? You seem very motivated to beat Pontiac?
A. Pontiac has business that I covet, hence indicated high motivation. I respect them for
their food and for the appearance of their truck though. As for Ford, I feel I can give them
a run for their money. I feel my food is just as good as theirs but they charge more. When
we are at events together, people sometimes notice longer queues at their food truck and
think more people want their food. But the real reason for shorter queues at my food
truck is that I am quicker at service than they are.
Q. It looks like Mercedes, Porsche, Hyundai and Bugatti are often at the same locations
that you are at, although may not be at the same time. You seem to not be motivated to
launch competitive actions against them. Why?
A. We are all part of the same group and they are my friends.
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APPENDIX 4
Interview with Chrysler:
Q. How did you approach the status question? Why did you rank Hyundai so high? Also,
why did you rank Ford and Renault so low (they had generally been ranked high by
others)? You ranked Nissan at medium-status (Nissan had generally been ranked high by
others)?
A. My answer was based on quality of food (as he saw it) and the extent to which I know
and like the person. I really like Hyundai. I ranked those that I’ve never tried low.
Q. What determines how closely you watch other food trucks? Why Ford (which had
generally been ranked high on status)? Interesting that Suzuki and Porsche are the ones
you watch most closely.
A. I watch Ford because they set the trend. They are popular and (salient to him). I watch
where they are and what they do and their business model. As for Suzuki and Porsche
(which served a type of food similar to what he did), I watch them to make sure I’m doing
different things from them. In general, I believe that developing a niche is better than cutthroat competition.
Q. Why are you so motivated to launch competitive moves against Jaguar and Renault
(which serve food of similar type)? Why Ford (which was generally ranked high-status)?
A. I think Jaguar is awful and rigged their way to the top of the popularity charts. As for
Renault, I feel I can do much better than them and have better things to offer. Ford
because they are the gold standard. It’s aiming for the top.
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Q. (Explained what I meant by status and elicited his general thoughts on the role of
status in this setting)
A. In general, who you know determines who gets good locations, although consistency
in food quality too is important.
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APPENDIX 5
Interview with Ferrari:
Q. How did you approach the status question? What led you to give Ford such a high
rating (Ford had generally been ranked high by everyone)? What about the others that
your ranked high?
A. I ranked high those I would eat from. I respect their quality and food. Some of them
also happen to be my friends. Jeep (that he had ranked highly) because they are the best
(in their category) in town. Renault (that he had ranked highly) because they are older. In
general, food trucks are community business, we feel we are in it together. One’s win is a
win for the entire group.
Q. Why do you watch Hyundai, Jeep, Ford and Nissan so closely? In general, what
factors determine which other food trucks you pay attention to and how closely you watch
them?
A. The ones I watch most closely are my friends. As for those I don’t watch I don’t know
them.
Q. What makes you so motivated to compete with Kia and Ford? In general, what factors
determine how motivated you are to launch competitive moves against other food trucks?
Porsche seems to often be at the same locations as you (though not at the same time) and
you don’t seem aware of or motivated to beat them?
A. I feel that some food trucks steal business. I feel Kia steals business from me by
undercutting on price. My quality is very good. I take great care to keep it that way. It’s
also about whether the other food truck offers a reliable substitute for my fare.
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Sometimes, those who go to another food truck simply won’t come to mine, because we
cater to different kinds of customers who want different things. I just haven’t paid much
attention to Porsche or noticed them, and they serve a different type of food.
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APPENDIX 6
Interview with Porsche:
Q. (General thoughts about competition within this business to begin with)
A. Most of the competition is for locations. Consistency is important, the location owner
has to be able to rely upon the food truck.
Q. How did you approach the status question? Why did you rank Renault so low (Renault
had generally been ranked high by others)?
A. Our answer was based on Facebook ratings and observing how popular the food trucks
were, how long the queues were, in some cases we know and respect the owner. No
specific reason for ranking Renault low. They don’t bring the food truck out much these
days.
Q. How did you approach the awareness question? Why did you rank Jeep and Kia so
high on how aware you were of them?
A. We keenly observe Jeep and Kia and their practices with a view to emulating them.
We are aware of and watching them because their business models are similar to ours.
We also know and respect the owner of Jeep. We observe the menus and prices of Jeep
and Kia and study their processes. Also, we observed and learned from other food trucks
when we were growing, not as much now given that we’ve made it. We observe
Mercedes because they are our friends, have great curb appeal, and you can generally see
long queues at them. In general, we notice the most popular food trucks at events.
Q. How did you approach the motivation question?
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A. We indicated high motivation to beat Jeep because they serve the same type of food
and are close to us in business model, and low motivation to beat Ferrari and Nissan
because they the serve different types of food and at different price points so we don’t
really compete. Someone heading to them at an event would not be heading to us.
Q. (Explained what I meant by status and elicited general thoughts on status and
competition in this context)
A. It is really important to know the location owners. We took off when we got (a
premier location) on Thursday evenings. That made it easy for us to get other locations.
It was not easy to get that location on Thursday evenings. We had to start there Sunday
evenings, a time that there weren’t many customers. One day an opportunity opened up
on Thursday evening, we took it, were consistent in our quality, and it clicked. In general,
it is important to get the prime times and location, for example, (a premier microbrewery) on a Friday evening. The time and place is important. Food trucks that serve
certain types of food cannot be at certain locations.
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APPENDIX 7
Interview with Mercedes:
Q. How did you approach the status question? Why did you rank Hyundai and Bugatti so
low?
A. Quality as I perceived it. Hyundai is low-quality and Bugatti is sub-standard!
Q. How did you approach the awareness question? Why do you watch Rover and Jeep,
and Hyundai? Why do you not watch Bugatti, surprising with Bugatti as they are often at
the same locations though not at the same time?
A. I watch Rover because I don’t want to be where they are, especially at events. I don’t
hold a high opinion or want to be associated or branded with them. I don’t watch Bugatti
because their quality is poor and they are not of the standard I would hold in high regard.
I watch Jeep and Hyundai because I know the owners.
Q. How did you approach the motivation question? Why are you so motivated to beat
Ford (which had generally been ranked high in status)?
A. I am motivated to beat them because they are a gold-standard.
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